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Abstract
The effects of educational systems, school-composition, track-level, parental 
background and immigrants’ origins on the achievement of 15-years old native and 
immigrant students. A reanalysis of PISA 2006
The main research question of this paper is the combined estimation of the effects 
of educational systems, school-composition and track-level on the educational 
achievement of 15-years-old students. We specifically focus on the effects of socio-
economic and ethnic background on achievement scores and to what extent these 
effects are affected by characteristics of the school, track or educational system these 
students are in. In doing so, we examine the ‘sorting’ mechanisms of schools and tracks 
in highly stratified, moderately stratified and comprehensive education systems. We 
use data from the 2006 PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) wave.
Compared to previous research in this area the main contribution of this paper is that 
we explicitly include track-level and school-level as separate units of analyses, which 
leads to less biased results of the effects of characteristics of the educational system. 
The results highlight the importance of including track-level and school-level factors 
in the debate of educational inequality of opportunity for students in different 
education contexts. The findings clearly indicate that the effects of educational 
system characteristics are flawed if the analysis uses only a country and a student 
level and ignores the track- and school-level characteristics. Moreover the inclusion 
of the track-level is necessary to avoid overestimation of the school-composition 
effect, especially in stratified educational systems. From a policy perspective, the most 
important finding is that educational system are not uniformly ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but 
they have different consequences for different groups. Some groups are better off 
in comprehensive systems, while other groups are better off in moderately or highly 
stratified systems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The effect of characteristics of national educational systems on average achievement 
levels of students as well on the effect of parental socio-economic status on students’ 
achievement has been the topic of many international comparisons. There is substantial 
agreement among scholars that the average achievement levels of students and the effect of 
parental background on these achievement levels vary systematically across national 
educational systems. The consensus seems to be that students have on average higher scores 
in comprehensive educational systems compared with equivalent students in highly stratified 
educational systems: countries where students follow the same curriculum up to age 16 show 
higher results on achievement tests than countries where students are selected into different 
tracks of secondary education at a very early age. Moreover the effect of parental background 
on the achievement of their offspring is much lower in the comprehensive systems than in the 
highly stratified ones (Breen & Jonsson, 2000; Buchmann & Hannum, 2001; OECD, 2005).  
Most of these studies use a simple two-level model with a distinction between 
countries (with characteristics of the national educational system) and students (with 
individual and family characteristics). They thus ignore the fact that there are more levels that 
affect the achievement of students. Students are nested in schools and within schools in 
different tracks and all of these environments are a source of variation in achievement levels.  
Recently Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) introduced a three-level model: 
countries, schools and students. They showed that school characteristics like socio-economic 
composition and ethnic diversity have substantial effects on achievement levels and also 
affect the relation between parental background and achievement. Moreover these school 
characteristics seem to mediate some of the effects of the characteristics of educational 
system that were found earlier. They show that one of the reasons why the relation between 
parental background and achievement is stronger in stratified educational systems is that these 
systems show stronger effects of the particular school a student attends.  
However these two papers still do not include the level of the track as a separate level 
in the analysis. This is a serious omission if we consider stratified systems. It is unlikely that 
the results of stratified systems pertain to all of the tracks that can be distinguished. In fact it 
might well be that the negative results of such systems only pertain to the lower or vocational 
tracks in these systems while opposite results might be found for higher or more general 
tracks. Also they identified schools only by administrative unit and not by track-level. This 
means that students in schools with different tracks are all regarded as being exposed to the 
same environment. Both omissions can produce flawed results, because track-level has a 
strong effect on achievement.  
Therefore this paper wants to improve the Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) papers 
on two points: 1. Inclusion of track characteristics; 2. Use of ‘track-within-school’ level, 
indexed by school-identification number, track-level and vocational orientation instead of the 
administrative school-level and define school-composition characteristics at this level.  
The main research question of this paper is the estimation of the effects of educational 
systems, school-composition and track-level on the educational achievement of 15-years-old 
students. We specifically focus on the effects of socio-economic and ethnic background on 
achievement scores and to what extent these effects are affected by characteristics of the 
school, track or educational system these students are in. In doing so, we examine the 
‘sorting’ mechanisms of schools and tracks in highly stratified, moderately stratified and 
comprehensive education systems. 
We will analyze native and immigrant students separately to test whether educational 
systems have the same consequences for both groups. Heus & Dronkers (2010a) found that 
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immigrant students did on average better in a moderately stratified educational system, while 
native students did on average better in a comprehensive educational system.  
We use the 2006 data wave of the Program for International Student Assessment PISA 
(OECD, 2007). We include only those countries that provide information about the countries 
of birth of students and parents, because earlier research (Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp, 
2008) has shown that these countries of origin are important control variables.i Therefore the 
analysis is based on 8,521 immigrant students from 35 different countries of origin, living in 
15 Western destination countries and 72,315 native students in these 15 countries. We use a 
four-level multi-level analysis with cross-classified origin and destination levels for the 
equations with immigrant students, and a normal four-level multi-level analysis for native 
students. 
The results highlight the importance of including track-level and school-level factors 
in the debate of educational inequality of opportunity for students in different education 
contexts. The findings clearly indicate that the effects of educational system characteristics 
are flawed if the analysis uses only a country and a student level and ignores the track- and 
school-level characteristics. Moreover the inclusion of the track-level is necessary to avoid 
overestimation of the school-composition effect, especially in stratified educational systems. 
From a policy perspective, the most important finding is that educational system are not 
uniformly ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but they have different consequences for different groups. Some 
groups are better off in comprehensive systems, while other groups are better off in 
moderately or highly stratified systems.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present an 
overview of the literature followed by the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and 
operationalisation of the variables. Section 4 describes the models and section 5 the main 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of the literatureii 
 
This paper builds, next to Dunne 2010, on previous comparative work that addressed 
the issue of educational inequality of opportunity depending on the degree of stratification of 
educational systems (Treiman & Yip, 1989; Muller & Karle, 1993; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993; 
Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Filmer & Pritchett, 1999; Shavit, Arum & Gamoran, 2007; Pfeffer, 
2008). The reproduction of inequality is a central concern of sociologists. This reproduction is 
not only affected by characteristics of the educational system, but also by characteristics of 
the school, specifically the school’s socioeconomic composition. However, the effect of the 
school’s socioeconomic composition and its ‘sorting’ effect may vary across countries. One 
reason the composition effect may vary across countries is that countries vary in the way they 
sort students for instruction during secondary education. In this section we will first present 
an overview of the research on school factors and subsequently on the institutional aspects of 
educational systems.  
 
2.1. School Factors 
Since the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) in the United States and the Plowden 
Report (Peaker, 1971) in the United Kingdom, there has been a debate on the relative 
importance of individual and school factors. These reports concluded that individual family 
background was more important than school factors in determining children’s educational 
achievement. Much research has concentrated, since these reports, on assessing the relative 
importance of individual versus school effects.  
Borrowing from both the economic and organisational definitions of school 
effectiveness (Scheerens & Bosker, 1997), we define schools as organisations that have 
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particular processes in place to turn inputs into output. Inputs to a school include the prior 
characteristics of students, whereas outputs include student achievement. The transformation 
process within a school is composed of a number of factors which include teaching and 
learning methods, track choices and organisational conditions that make it possible for 
students to learn. Early research already showed the importance of parental socioeconomic 
status on educational achievement (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Jencks, 1972, Jencks et al, 1979, 
Hauser & Sewell, 1986). Later research also identified a link between differences in 
achievement scores and differences in the composition of the student body within the schools. 
They show that the mean socioeconomic background of a school has an impact on student 
achievement over and above the effect of a student’s individual socioeconomic background 
(Gamoran, 1992; Willms, 1986, 1992).  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005) used 
the PISA 2000 data to look at how the socioeconomic composition of schools affects 
achievement from a comparative perspective. In line with the research mentioned above, the 
report concluded that the school’s average socioeconomic status had a statistically significant 
impact on student performance in reading literacy in all but four countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland and Korea). Furthermore, school-composition effects far outweighed the impact of 
other policy-amenable characteristics. Together with individual characteristics, school’s 
socioeconomic composition explained on average 69 per cent of the school effects, compared 
to only 6 per cent explained by policy-amenable school characteristics.  
The results from these studies show the strong link between the socioeconomic 
composition of the school and student performance and achievement. However, studies have 
not shown whether this strong relationship between school-composition and student 
achievement varies systematically across educational systems. Nevertheless this seems 
plausible: as countries vary in the way they sort their students for instruction, so will 
composition effects vary across countries. 
One important sorting mechanism is ability grouping or tracking. Many studies have 
found evidence that early division of students into ability groups or tracks increases inequality 
(Kerckhoff, 1986; Gamoran, 2004; Oakes, Gamoran & Page, 1992). Research has explored 
achievement and inequality in distinct school types (Hargreaves, 1967; Ammermuller, 2005; 
Dustmann, 2004), in distinct tracks (Rosenbaum, 1976; Metz, 1978; Oakes, 1985; Gamoran, 
1992; Gamoran et al., 1995) and placement into sets (or curricular differentiation; Lucas, 
1999). Although these all represent different ways to differentiate students into ability 
groupings, all types of ability grouping result in unequal educational opportunity.  
Ability grouping is not just a school characteristic but most often a characteristic that 
directly results from the institutional design of the educational system. We will explore this in 
more detail in the section below. 
 
2.2. Stratification in Educational Systems 
Educational institutions have been referred to by Spring (1976) as society’s ‘sorting 
machine’. Organisational characteristics of schools and education systems have the effect of 
channelling students into different educational paths and further life chances. All 
industrialised countries use organisational mechanisms to sort students into hierarchically 
arranged tracks, but these mechanisms vary in both their nature and also in their timing. 
Hopper (1968:30) argued that “the structure of educational systems, especially those within 
industrial society, can be understood primarily in terms of the structure of their selection 
processes.” Systems can be identified as those that use separate school types to stratify 
students, those that have a high level of within-school/internal stratification without distinct 
school types, and systems that are comprehensive with low levels of within-school 
differentiation.  
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Early in the debate on the impact of how countries sort their students for instruction, 
Turner (1960) contributed to the discussion by characterising educational systems as being 
either contest mobility or sponsored mobility systems. He described comprehensive education 
systems as ‘contest mobility’ and described the objective as being “to train as many as 
possible in the skills necessary for elite status so as to give everyone a chance to maintain 
competition at the highest pitch” (Turner, 1960: 863). Turner labelled highly selective 
systems as being ‘sponsored mobility’ and the objective of such systems is to “indoctrinate 
elite culture in only those presumably who will enter the elite, lest there grow a dangerous 
number of ‘angry young men’ who have elite skills without elite station” (Turner, 1960: 863).  
Following this argument many studies have looked at the degree of stratification of 
educational systems and its impact on inequality of educational opportunity. Studies have 
revealed the variability across countries in the magnitude of family background effects on 
student outcomes (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001) and how this is partly explained by the way 
in which a country sorts students for instruction (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2006). Findings 
from Breen & Jonsson (2000), Mare (1993), and Shavit & Blossfeld (1993), suggest that 
comprehensive school reform in countries with previously highly stratified education systems 
reduced inequality of educational opportunity. However, Breen & Jonsson (2005) in their 
review of inequality of opportunity in a comparative perspective, suggest the need to “draw 
on evidence from more countries.”  
The OECD (2005) report “School Factors Related to Quality and Equity, Results from 
PISA 2000,” which utilised data from PISA 2000, is one example where evidence was drawn 
from a wide range of countries. The results indicate the relevance of the structure of 
secondary education in each participating country. The report used age of selection as an 
indicator of institutional differentiation and considered its effect on student achievement. The 
results indicate that education systems with the lowest degree of differentiation achieved “the 
highest mean student performance in reading literacy” (OECD, 2005:62). Hanushek & 
Woessmann (2006) also found evidence that early tracking reduced mean performance using 
the PISA 2000 data.  
The OECD report also indicated that in countries with early selection, the correlation 
between students’ socioeconomic background and students’ performance was stronger. These 
findings supported Kerckhoff’s (1995) argument that the effects of family socioeconomic 
status on educational outcomes were stronger in highly stratified systems of education. Later 
analysis of PISA data by Marks, Cresswell & Ainley (2006) confirmed this finding that 
countries with highly tracked systems tended to show stronger relationships between 
socioeconomic background and achievement. Horn  (2009)  also  concluded  that  the  early 
age of selection in some countries has a close  link with high inequality of opportunity. 
Pfeffer (2008:556) looked at which nations were most successful in reducing the influence of 
family background on educational attainment by using the International Adult Literacy 
Survey and found that “rigid education systems with dead-end educational pathways appear to 
be a hindrance to the equalisation of educational opportunities.” Evidence from Hanushek & 
Woessmann (2006) showed that increased inequality within highly stratified education 
systems was a result of students in the lower percentiles losing more than the gain amongst 
students in the upper ones. Lower performers suffered more in highly stratified systems, 
resulting in a decreased mean performance.  
 
2.3. Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) results 
A major drawback of many of the previously mentioned studies is that they fail to 
combine the two lines of research: the effects of school factors and the effects of 
characteristics of the educational system. They either concentrate on the effects of schools or 
they concentrate on the effects of educational systems. Both may produce flawed results as 
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the effects of schools may differ across different educational systems and part of the effects of 
educational systems is in fact produced by schools. Recently Dunne (2010) and Dronkers 
(2010a) made a major improvement by introducing a three-level model in the analysis: 
countries, schools and students.  
Using PISA 2006 data Dunne selected twenty-four countries that represent a wide 
range of comparable societies. The countries selected are Australia, Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States.iii She applied a three-level model 
(students, school, countries) and distinguished between native and immigrant students, with 
only two dummies to control for first and second generation. 
She found that students in comprehensive schooling systems have higher overall 
average achievement which appears to reflect the fact that students in lower socioeconomic 
composition schools do not lose as much as those in low socioeconomic composition schools 
in highly stratified education systems. Also, she found very little difference in the average 
achievement of students in highly stratified education systems and moderately stratified 
education systems.  
Inequality of opportunity at the individual-level appeared not to be as Dunne expected 
from the evidence in previous research. Students from a higher socioeconomic background 
actually achieve less in highly stratified education systems than their counterparts in 
comprehensive systems, unless they are in high socioeconomic composition schools. 
Therefore, although inequality in educational opportunity is larger in highly stratified 
systems, it is mediated through school-composition effects. Still, there is a very small 
individual social background effect within schools in highly stratified education systems.  
The degree of stratification of the educational system determines the extent to which 
the socioeconomic composition of the school becomes a crucial element in the achievement 
of students. Placement into a higher socioeconomic school is a more significant condition for 
achievement in highly stratified systems. In comprehensive systems, achievement is very 
similar across schools with different socioeconomic compositions; therefore there is an 
advantage for those in lower socioeconomic composition schools in this system compared to 
those in low socioeconomic schools in highly stratified education systems. On the other hand, 
individual socioeconomic background has a stronger effect on achievement within schools in 
comprehensive education systems.  
Interestingly, although average student achievement varied greatly depending on the 
school’s socioeconomic composition in highly stratified education systems, within schools the 
gap in achievement between students from the top and the bottom socioeconomic 
backgrounds was relatively narrow in comparison to students in comprehensive systems and 
moderately stratified systems. It appears that there is greater between-school equity within 
comprehensive education systems, but within-school equity is higher in highly stratified 
systems. Therefore, it may be more difficult for lower class students to enter higher 
socioeconomic composition schools in highly stratified education systems, but once these 
students have entered such schools the effect of their individual background does not hinder 
them so strongly to achieve high scores.  
Dronkers (2010a) also used the 2006 PISA data, based on a slightly different selection 
of countries than Dunne. He included only those countries that provide information about the 
countries of birth of students and their parents, because he needed that information for the 
measurement of ethnic diversity. He found that a greater ethnic diversity of schools hampers 
the educational performance of both natives and immigrants to a similar degree. However, the 
negative effect is smaller in education systems with a low degree of stratification in secondary 
education, while the effect is greatest in education systems with a high degree of stratification. 
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Contrary to his expectations a greater diversity in the socio-economic composition of a school 
has no effect on the educational performance of natives and immigrants. The socioeconomic 
composition of a school, on the other hand, is of great importance. He found relatively few 
differences in the effect of the average parental educational level of students at school in the 
different education systems. 
Dronkers (2010a) also found that students from non-Islamic Asia have an advantage 
when it comes to educational performance, compared to immigrants from other origin 
countries. Students from Islamic countries have a substantial disadvantage in educational 
performance compared to other immigrants. 
Finally Dronkers (2010a) found that education systems do not always have the same 
positive or negative effects on the achievement of native students and students with an 
immigrant background.  
 
2.4. Hypotheses 
As indicated above the studies by Dunne (2010) and Dronkers (2010a) distinguish 
three levels in the analyses: countries, schools and students. Although this is an improvement 
compared to the previous two-level studies, these studies are still biased as they ignore one of 
the key levels, the level of track. Track placement is one of the major characteristics affecting 
inequality of educational opportunity and it serves as the ‘sorting’ mechanism of educational 
systems. It is therefore strange that this level has never been separately identified in previous 
analyses. Ignoring this level assumes that having a strongly stratified system will have the 
same effect for the students in the higher as well as the lower tracks. Similarly, ignoring this 
level assumes that school factors have the same effect for students of all the tracks within that 
school. Both assumptions are very unlikely. Our first three hypotheses can be seen as 
improving the hypotheses of Dunne (2010) by explicitly including the track-level as an 
additional explanatory level. We have added two additional hypotheses, one about the 
possible different effect of educational systems for immigrants and natives (based on the 
analysis of Heus & Dronkers, 2010) and a second one about reproduction by the combination 
of individual parental class and school-composition (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). 
 
Educational systems, school-composition, track and parental ESCS (Economic, Social and 
Cultural Status) 
1. Track placement explains a substantial part of the effect of ESCS school-composition on 
achievement, but mostly in highly stratified educational systems, due to the institutionalized 
borders in these systems.  
2. The positive effect of ESCS school-composition on achievement is strongest in highly and 
moderately stratified systems, because ESCS school-composition indicates both the level of 
the track and ESCS neighborhood-composition, while ESCS school-composition in 
comprehensive educational systems indicates only differentiation in ESCS neighborhood-
composition. But if one controls for track-level, this stronger effect of ESCS school-
composition in highly and moderately stratified systems should disappear.  
3. If one controls for track placement, the effect of individual ESCS on achievement is 
stronger in comprehensive systems: the lack of selection into hierarchical track-levels forces 
higher class parents to use their cultural and social capital more to ensure sufficient school-
performance at age 15. 
 
Immigrant students and educational systems 
4. Students with an immigrant background have the highest achievement in strongly stratified 
systems, because these provide them with clear information about their scholastic 
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requirements or in comprehensive educational systems, because these do not have 
institutionalized borders, which might preclude higher educational performances.  
 
Reproduction 
5. The interaction effect of individual ESCS and ESCS school-composition on achievement is 
positive and equal in all educational systems, because this combination of individual and 
school-composition ESCS is an indicator of a higher level of unmeasured cultural and 
financial capital of parents and school. 
 
3. Data and operationalization 
 
3.1. PISA 2006 
Since 2000, the OECD has tri-annually conducted large-scale tests among 15-year-
olds living in its member states and partner states in order to assess students’ mathematical, 
reading, and scientific literacy. The purpose of this test is to map the competences in the fields 
of mathematics, physics and reading at the end of the period of compulsory education (at the 
age of 15 or 16 in most Western countries). We make use of the 2006 wave. The PISA data 
for each participating country constitute a representative sample of the schools that teach 15-
year-old students. Each school that has been selected tests a sample of all 15-year-olds, 
irrespective of their track or grade. In addition to educational performance, PISA also supplies 
information on a large number of individual background characteristics and school 
characteristics. The school principals provide details on a variety of school characteristics, 
such as student-teacher ratio, teacher shortages and the location of the school. In the student 
questionnaires, students are asked for information on such things as the educational level of 
their parents, the availability of resources at home, the language spoken at home and the 
country in which their parents were born. Considering the fact that the information on the 
country of origin of both parents is crucial for our research question, we can only include 
countries that have actually provided information on these countries of origin. Although no 
fewer than 57 countries took part in PISA 2006, only the following 15 Western countries had 
this information available: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Scotland and 
Switzerland.iv The selection leaves us with 8,581 immigrant students from 35 different 
countries of origin, living in 15 Western destination countriesv and all 72,315 native students 
in these 15 Western countries. Descriptive statistics can be found in appendix A. For a 
detailed description of the data and performance scores of the students from the different 
countries of origin, we refer to previous publications (Dronkers, 2010a; Heus & Dronkers, 
2010).  
 
3.2. Schools and tracks-within-schools as separate units of analysis 
The PISA data contain two cross-national indicators of the track the students are 
attending. The student is asked whether he or she is currently enrolled in a certain track of a 
certain level. This was later recoded in the international format distinguishing between 
general and vocational tracks on the one hand and between lower and higher tracks on the 
other hand. This recoding by the National PISA data managers probably reflects the official 
national policy regarding the placement of different tracks into the International classification. 
We can see this clearly by comparing for instance Finland and Scotland in appendix B: the 
15-year-old students in Finland all attend lower general education while their counterparts in 
Scotland all attend higher general education. There was no other information available in the 
PISA data to differentiate this coding any further to make it more comparable. The same held 
for Germany where all students with a general track were coded at the lower level. But the 
  8
national specific program code in the PISA data for Germany allowed us to distinguish 
between those students of general lower education with and without access to higher 
secondary education and between lower and higher vocational education (see appendix B). 
For the other countries this was not possible. As a general result, the level of “noise” in the 
measurement of the real track-level will increase and therefore underestimate the “real” track-
level effect. This should be kept in mind when looking at the results of track-level effects.vi  
Schools are the sampling unit in the PISA survey. But these schools often contain both 
general and vocational education and both levels within secondary education. The school-
level therefore reflects more the administrative unit of the educational institution, while the 
combined two track characteristics reflect more the daily reality of the teaching and learning 
environment, and also of the social intercourse between students and teachers. This daily life 
unit is a better indicator of the actual school environment of teaching and learning than the 
administrative unit. We call this the track-within-school-level. We compute this level per 
country for each student by combining his or her school identification number, the kind of 
track he or she is following (vocational or general), and the track-level (lower or higher). The 
result of this redefinition of school environment from an administrative unit into the daily life 
unit of teaching and learning is visible in appendix B. For example in Australia 345 schools 
offered lower general education, 133 schools higher general education and 10 schools higher 
vocational education for more than 5 students per school. In order to avoid extreme results for 
combinations with few cases, we deleted all combinations of school identification number, 
vocational or general education, and the track-level, which had less than 6 students per 
school. This means that the analysis will be based on 8,521 immigrant students from 35 
different countries of origin, living in 15 Western destination countries and 72,329 native 
students in 15 countries. 
 
3.3. Dependent variable: linguistic performance 
The dependent variable in this study is linguistic performance. To measure linguistic 
skills accurately would make the test too long to be feasible. Hence a large number of very 
similar, but shorter tests were created. As such different tests can never have exactly the same 
degree of difficulty, Item Response Modelling (IRM) was used to achieve comparable results 
between students who made different tests. In this analysis, we averaged the five plausible 
values that were obtained from the IRM. The linguistic skills scores were standardised for the 
OECD countries using an average of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Appendix C shows 
the average literacy scores for immigrant students for the origin and destination countries. 
Appendix E shows the outcomes if the dependent variable would be mathematical literacy or 
science literacy. The results indicate that the conclusions do not change much if we would 
take another dependent variable.  
 
3.4. Individual-level variables of all students 
 Parental ESCS. The Index of economic, social and cultural status of the parents 
(ESCS) is a composite index created in the PISA dataset of the occupational status of the 
parents measured with the ISEI scale (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman & De Leeuw, 1992), 
the educational level of the parents measured with the ISCED classification (UNESCO, 
2006), and the presence of any material or cultural resources at the students' homes.vii This 
combination of the parents' occupational status and educational level, together with the 
resources at home, produces the strongest indicator of the parental environment. We set the 
average of parental ESCS for each destination country to zero, to ensure that the comparisons 
for this item show the result for the average student in these countries.  
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 Grade. Since not all students attend the same grade, we have included a variable to 
account for this. As a result of between-country variance in the way grades are costructed, we 
have standardized the grade around the modal grade in a country.  
 Female. We control for gender effects by using a dummy variable indicating whether a 
student is female (1) or male (0).  
 
3.5. Individual-level variables of immigrant students 
 Regions of origin. On the basis of earlier analyses of PISA 2003 data (Levels & 
Dronkers, 2008; Levels et al., 2008), we combined the countries of origin in five regions of 
origin in order to simplify the presentation of the analysis: 1. Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Rumania, 
Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine); 2. non-Islamic Asia (China, 
India, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam); 3. Islamic countries (Albania, Bangladesh, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Turkey); 4. Western OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States); 5. Sub-Sahara Africa (Cap Verde, Congo, 
South Africa).viii 
 Second generation migrant. In line with Rumbaut (2004), we have constructed 
immigrant generation variables that combine information on the country of birth of both 
parents and the student. Second generation immigrant children are those students of whom at 
least one parent was born abroad, but who have been born in the current country of 
destination themselves. First generation immigrant students have been born abroad 
themselves as well. A dummy indicates whether the student is second generation (1) or not 
(0). 
 One parent migrant, other parent native. A dummy variable was used to identify 
students who had one immigrant and one native-born parent (1); students with two non-native 
parents represent the reference group (0). 
 Home language same as in destination country. We included a dummy variable to 
differentiate immigrant children who speak one of their destination country’s official 
languages at home (1) from children who speak a foreign language (0).  
 
3.6. Variables measured at the tracks-within-schools-level 
 Vocational. A dummy variable indicates whether a student is currently enrolled in a 
(pre-) vocational (1) or general (0) type of education (ISCED classification).  
 Higher secondary. This dummy distinguishes the current track-level within secondary 
education as higher secondary (1) or lower secondary (0).  
 Ethnic diversity. Using the numbers of students from all 35 countries of origin, we 
calculated the Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity per track-within-school (varying between 0 
and 1).ix Every 35 countries of origin here represented a separate ethnic group, also the native 
students.x The index should be interpreted as follows: the value 0 means that there was no 
ethnic diversity at all in the school, because all students came from the same country of 
origin. Values that approach 1 represent a very high degree of diversity: the students at that 
track-within-school are equally recruited from all origin countries, including the home 
country. The Herfindahl index has been criticised for being ‘colour-blind’ (Stolle, Soraka & 
Johnston, 2008; Voas, Crockett & Olson, 2002), which means that a school with 20% Turkish 
students and 80% native students, obtains the same diversity score as a school with 20% 
native students and 80% Turkish students. The specific ethnic composition of the track-
within-school is therefore also important, and hence we used appropriate indicators (see 
below). 
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 ESCS diversity. In a similar way, we calculated the socio-cultural diversity of the 
tracks-within-schools. Using the ESCS scores of the parents we divided these parental scores 
in 5 categories; the group with the lowest 10% scores, the 10-30% group; the 30-70% group; 
the 70-90% group and the group with the highest 10% scores.xi On the basis of these 5 
categories we calculated the Herfindahl index of socio-cultural diversity (varying between 0 
and 1).xii The index should be interpreted as follows: a value 0 means that there is no 
diversity, because all parents of all students at that particular track-within-school are in the 
same ESCS category. A value approaching 1 indicates a very high level of diversity, 
indicating that the students are equally recruited from the five ESCS categories. As this 
Herfindahl index of socio-cultural diversity is “level-blind” and therefore insensitive to the 
average parental educational level, we have also added the average ESCS of a school to the 
analysis (see below). 
 Percent students from immigrant regions. As indicated above the countries of origin 
were combined into five categories in order to simplify the presentation of the analysis. For 
each track-within-school, we calculated five indexes: the percentage of students from Eastern 
Europe; the percentage of students from non-Islamic Asia; the percentage of students from 
Islamic countries; the percentage of students from Western OECD countries; and the 
percentage of students from Sub-Sahara Africa. These indexes are the necessary counterparts 
of the Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity, which after all is “colour-blind”. Together, these 
indexes measure the combined effect of ethnic diversity and ethnic share.  
 Average ESCS. We also calculated the average parental ESCS per track-within-school. 
This index is the necessary counterpart of the Herfindahl index of socio-cultural diversity, 
which is “level-blind”. Together, these indexes measure the combined effect of socio-cultural 
diversity and socio-cultural share.  
 
3.7. Variables measured at the school-level  
 Selective admittance of students to the school is a scale in the PISA data based on the 
answers of the principals indicating whether admittance to their school was based on 
academic record and/or on recommendation. We divided the scale in three dummies: selective 
admittance, some selection and no selection. Although these dummies are measured at the 
school-level, we use them to control the amount of entrance selectivity at the track-level. 
 Teacher shortage. The degree in which schools suffer a shortage of teachers is an 
index in the PISA data which indicates according to the principals to what extent education is 
hampered by the following items: a lack of qualified physics teachers, a lack of qualified 
mathematics teachers, a lack of qualified language teachers and a lack of qualified teachers 
for the other subjects. This index is based on the answers given by the school principals. The 
average of this index for teacher shortage was set to zero for all destination countries and all 
students, to ensure that the comparisons for this item show the result for the student in schools 
with an average shortage of teachers.  
 Student-staff ratio. The student-staff ratio (the number of students per member of staff 
per school) is based on the answer given by the school principals. The average for this ratio 
was set to zero for all destination countries and all students, to ensure that the comparisons for 
this item show the result for the students in schools with an average student-staff ratio.  
 Urbanisation. Two dummies were constructed to indicate whether a school is located 
in a (large) city or in a rural area. Schools in an urbanized countryside or in (small) towns 
serve as the reference category. 
 Schoolsize. Number of students in the school. 
 Private public. Educational systems differ in the shares of public and private schools 
and in the degree of state grants for these private scores. Two dummies were constructed to 
separate private dependent and private independent schools from public schools. These 
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variables control for these system differences and effectiveness of these school-types 
(Dronkers & Avram, 2010a and 2010b).  
 
3.8. Variables measured at the country-level  
Stratification. To measure the level of differentiation of the educational system, we 
classified countries according to their stratification level. We define Austria, Switzerland, 
Germany and Liechtenstein as highly stratified systems; Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and 
Luxembourg as moderately stratified systems; and Finland, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Australia, Scotland, and Latvia as comprehensive educational systems that are hardly 
stratified. Our division is based on information on the first age at which students have to 
choose between different educational types, the number of school-types students can choose 
between, and the presence of more hidden types of ability grouping (Heus & Dronkers, 2010; 
OECD, 2007). In the highly stratified countries, children can choose between at least 3 
different educational types at age 10 (Germany, Austria), 11 (Liechtenstein), or 12 
(Switzerland). In comprehensive systems, children are not tracked into different educational 
types before age 15. We use dummy variables indicating whether countries have highly 
stratified, moderately stratified or comprehensive education systems.  
Age of selection. Apart from these three dummies, age of selection is included in the 
analysis.  
 
4. Models 
 
The multilevel analyses are done separately for natives (table 1) and immigrant 
students (table 2).xiii The multilevel analysis for the immigrant students uses cross-classified 
multilevel regression analyses (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Tubergen 2005), because the 
countries of origin and destination cannot be structured hierarchically. Because of the 
maximum of 5 levels in MlWin, we could not use schools as a separate level above the track-
within-schools level. A cross-classified analysis for immigrant students needs, apart from the 
four levels for pupils, tracks, schools and destination countries, two more levels, one for the 
origin countries and the other for the cross-classified identification. However, six levels are 
impossible in MlWin. Therefore this multilevel analysis has three hierarchical levels: 
countries of origin/destination, track-within-schools and students. School characteristics are 
thus transferred to the tracks-within-schools level. The multilevel analysis for the native 
students does not need a country of origin level. Therefore we could use four hierarchical 
levels: countries, schools, tracks-within-schools and students.  
 
Models 
 The models in both multi-level analyses are the same. Model 0 is the empty model, 
which indicates how much variance is situated at the different levels. This model is important 
because it shows that a relatively large amount of variance is related to the track-within-
schools level, underlining the importance of the distinction between schools and tracks-
within-schools (see table 1 and 2). It also shows that a larger amount of variance is related to 
the country of origin than to the country of destination, underlining the importance of 
including the countries of origin for explaining achievement differences among immigrant 
students (see table 2).  
Model 1 includes the individual characteristics and the educational system 
characteristics, plus the interactions between the latter and parental ESCS. Model 1 resembles 
thus the standard approach to the analysis of educational systems effects, with country-level 
characteristics directly affecting educational performance. The only difference is that this 
model already contains the other distinguished levels like the tracks-within-schools level, the 
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school-level and/or the origin country-level. In order to estimate the relevance of our 
approach, we present in Appendix D the same model 1 and the same data but with only 2 
levels: students and countries. The omission of the school- and tracks-within-schools-levels 
increases the amount of variance at the individual-level and at the country-level. Also the 
parameters of the individual variables tend to be stronger in a two-level model than in a 
comparable four-level model. Especially the effects of parental ESCS are larger in a two-level 
approach than in the more correct four-level approach. Moreover the interactions between 
parental ESCS and educational systems characteristics are smaller in a two-level approach 
than in the more correct four-level approach. This is true both for native and immigrant 
students, if we do not take into account the immigration history variables and the origin 
countries.  
Model 2 adds some social and ethnic composition variables at the track-within-school-
level: the shares of immigrant students, the average parental ESCS, the ECSC- and ethnic 
diversity and two interaction terms between educational system and average parental ECSC to 
the equation of model 1. This model assumes that most of the variance at the school- or track-
within-schools-level is related with the social and ethnic school-composition and not with 
differences in the curriculum of the track. Model 2 comes closest to the approach of Dunne 
(2010), who introduced for the first time a school-level between the educational system-level 
and the students-level. 
In model 3 we add the curriculum characteristics of the track (vocational orientation of 
the track; the level of the track; and two dummies regarding selective admittance although 
these dummies are measured at the school-level) as well as the interaction between the level 
of the track and the stratification of the educational system to the equation of model 1. This 
model assumes that most of the variance at the school- or track-within-schools-level is related 
with differences in the track and not with the social and ethnic school-composition. 
Model 4 combines models 2 and 3 by adding the social and ethnic composition 
variables as well as the curriculum characteristics of the track. The results for model 4 show 
that both aspects (composition and curriculum characteristics of the track) need to be included 
in the analysis in order to get a better fit with the data. Also the parameters of composition 
and curriculum variables are significant in this combined inclusion in the equation. This 
model best reflects our new approach of including curriculum characteristics next to 
characteristics of the students, the social and ethnic school-composition and characteristics of 
the educational system. 
In models 5 and 6 we add more school variables and interactions to the equation of 
model 4 in order to make sure that the results of model 4 are not biased by the omission of 
these variables and interactions. These additions do not substantially alter the results of model 
4.  
 
5. Main results 
 
<tables 1, 2 and 3 about here>  
Table 1 presents the outcomes of the different models for the native students while 
table 2 presents the outcomes for the immigrant students. Table 3 summarizes some of the 
main results of the outcomes of model 6 in tables 1 and 2, especially the different effects of 
parental ESCS, ECSC school-composition and track-level in the three educational systems. 
The scores for immigrant students in table 3 pertain to first generation immigrant students 
from Western OECD countries whose home language is not the same as in the destination 
country and who have two non-native parents. The scores of the immigrant students from 
Eastern Europe, non-Islamic Asia, Islamic countries and Sub-Saharan African countries can 
be found by changing these scores with -8.2, +18.6, -35.3 and -15.0 respectively (see model 6, 
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table 2). The scores of second-generation immigrant students can be found by increasing these 
scores with +9.3, of those who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2 
and those with mixed parents with +5.8 (see model 6, table 2). 
 
5.1. The different importance of tracks in different educational systems 
Our first hypothesis assumes that track-levels explain a substantial part of the effect of 
ESCS school-composition on achievement, but mostly in highly stratified educational 
systems, due to the institutionalized borders in these systems. If we compare the log 
likelihood of model 4 in tables 1 and 2 with that of model 2 (only school-composition) and 
model 3 (only curriculum characteristics) we see that the log likelihood is lower in model 4 
than that in models 2 and 3 for both populations. This supports our first hypothesis that track-
level explains a substantial part of the school-composition effect and that the effects of 
curriculum characteristics should be distinguished from the effects of school-composition. 
But compared with the log likelihood of model 1 (only individual characteristics) the addition 
of school-composition (model 2) lowers the log likelihood more than the addition of 
curriculum characteristics (model 3). This means that school-composition can better explain 
variance in educational performance than the curriculum characteristics in both populations. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that school-composition – although defined at the track-
within-school-level – explains as much of the school-level variation as of the track-within-
school-level variation (see model 2 in table 1), while the curriculum variables only explain 
track-within-school-level variation. This seems to suggest that the school-composition is as 
much a school-characteristic as it is a track-within-school characteristic. In other words, 
school-composition varies as much between schools as within schools between track-levels. 
 The interaction terms between track-level and strongly or moderately stratified 
educational systems are positive and significant for both populations, in accordance with the 
first hypothesis. It means that for the higher level there is less difference between the 
educational systems. The main differences occur at the lower level. To illustrate: for native 
students at the low level the difference between moderate and comprehensive systems is 45,5 
to the advantage of the comprehensive system (model 3 in table 1), while for the higher level 
this has changed into a slight positive advantage for the moderate stratified systems of +14,4 
(- 0,6 - 45,5 + 59,3). For immigrant students these figures are -41,1 and +7,5 respectively. 
Interestingly the interaction term between track-level and moderately stratified educational 
systems is stronger than the interaction term between track-level and strongly stratified 
educational systems at least for native students. For immigrant students both interaction terms 
are more or less the same. 
 
5.2. The different importance of ESCS school-composition in different educational systems. 
Our second hypothesis assumes that the positive effect of ESCS school-composition 
on achievement is strongest in highly and moderately stratified systems, because ESCS 
school-composition indicates both the level of the curriculum and ESCS neighborhood-
composition, while ESCS school-composition in comprehensive educational systems 
indicates only differentiation in ESCS neighborhood-composition. Model 2 in tables 1 and 2 
(only school-composition) shows that ESCS school-composition has strong effects on 
educational achievement, both for native and immigrant students in all systems, but much 
stronger in the moderately (both groups) and highly (only immigrants) stratified systems than 
in the comprehensive systems (positive effects of the interaction terms). However, after the 
inclusion of the curriculum variables (model 4 in tables 1 and 2) these interaction effects are 
strongly reduced and become insignificant in three out of four cases. This indicates that part 
of the observed effect of the ESCS school-composition is due to curriculum effects in 
accordance with our second hypothesis. The only remaining effect of ESCS school-
  14
composition is for immigrants in highly stratified systems. This suggests that the strong 
results of Dunne’s (2010) of school-composition were partly caused by the fact that she did 
not include the track-level in her analyses.  
 
5.3. The different importance of individual ESCS in different educational systems. 
  Our third hypothesis assumes that the effect of individual ESCS on achievement is 
stronger in comprehensive systems. The lack of selection into hierarchical track-levels forces 
higher-class parents to use their cultural and social capital more to ensure sufficient school-
performance at the end of secondary school. Tables 1 and 2 show that individual ESCS has 
strong effects on educational achievement, both for native and immigrant students. These 
individual ESCS effects tend to be a little bit larger for the native students than for the 
immigrant students (see table 3). Individual ESCS of immigrants might be a less good 
indicator of their resources (ability, social, cultural) than for native parents. Also the positive 
selection of immigrants due to the obstacles and challenges of migration might be an 
explanation of this lower effect of individual ESCS on achievement of immigrant students 
(Feliciano, 2005; Dronkers & Heus, 2010a).  
The same table 3 also shows that the effects of individual ESCS is weaker in 
moderately and strongly stratified educational systems for native and immigrant students, in 
accordance with our third hypothesis and Dunne’s (2010) results. Thus, her results cannot be 
explained by her omission of track-level in her analyses.  
 
5.4. Immigrants and educational systems. 
Our fourth hypothesis assumes that students with an immigrant background have the 
highest achievement in either strongly stratified systems, because these provide them with 
clear information about their scholastic requirements or in comprehensive educational 
systems, because they do not have institutionalized curriculum borders which precludes high 
educational performances. The results of table 3 support this expectation only for the 
comprehensive educational systems, but not for strongly stratified systems. The achievement 
score of Western OECD first generation immigrant students is largest in comprehensive 
systems (457.7) while their scores in the other two educational systems are slightly (but not 
significant) lower (441.0). In contrast the achievement score of native students is highest in 
comprehensive systems (483.4) and lowest in moderately stratified systems (466.6). The 
achievement differences between Western OECD first generation immigrant students and 
native students are smallest in comprehensive (483.4 - 457.7 = 25.7) and moderately stratified 
systems (466.6 - 441.0 = 25.6) and largest in strongly stratified systems (481.5 – 441.0 = 
40.5). It is also interesting to note that the effect of ESCS school-composition in strongly 
stratified systems is larger for Western OECD first generation immigrants’ than native 
children (63.2 versus 43.5) but that in moderately stratified system this difference in effect of 
ESCS school-composition is smaller (35.9 versus 52.5).  
As indicated above, the scores for immigrant students in table 3 pertain to first 
generation immigrant students from Western OECD countries whose home language is not 
the same as in the destination country and who have two non-native parents. The scores for 
the other immigrant groups can be found by simply adding or distracting the relevant 
parameters from model 6 in table 2. But this does not change the different outcomes for the 
different educational systems.  
However, these results are only true for the average students, not for various 
subgroups. Table 4 gives the estimated reading scores for students with the lowest and highest 
parental ECSC scores in schools with the lowest and highest average ECSC school-
composition in the three educational systems for both natives and Western OECD first 
generation immigrants.xiv The results indicate that students from high ESCS parents perform 
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best in schools with a high ESCS composition in comprehensive systems. This result holds 
for both native and Western OECD first generation immigrant students and for all tracks 
(vocational lower, general lower and general higher). These students perform worst in schools 
with a low ECSC composition in moderately stratified systems (natives) or strongly stratified 
systems (immigrants). The situation is quite different for the students with low ECSC parents. 
They perform best in schools with a high ESCS composition in moderately stratified systems 
(natives) or strongly stratified systems (immigrants). And they perform worst in schools with 
a low ECSC composition in comprehensive systems. This result holds again for all tracks 
(vocational lower, general lower and general higher). In other words: students from different 
ESCS backgrounds do not have the same educational opportunities and constraints in the 
different educational systems. A generic educational policy for these different groups might 
therefore produce different outcomes for students from low and high ECSC parents. 
Interestingly the educational outcomes for immigrant and native students with comparable 
ESCS background are more alike.  
  
5.5. Reproduction 
Our fifth hypothesis assumes that the interaction effect of individual ESCS and ESCS 
school-composition on achievement is positive and equal in all educational systems, because 
this combination of individual and school-composition ESCS is an indicator of a higher level 
of unmeasured cultural and financial capital of parents and schools. The basic idea is that 
individual and school ESCS reinforce each other, which will show up in a positive interaction 
term. Model 6 in tables 1 and 2 shows that this hypothesis is not supported by our analysis, 
neither for the native nor for the immigrant students. The opposite seems more correct: the 
interaction is negative and significant for native students. This negative effect might result 
from measurement errors in the individual indicators but also from regression-to-the-mean. 
Although this result does not directly invalidate the reproduction theory, it does invalidate 
some of their strong claims like the reinforcement effect. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
6.1. The importance of school- and track-level.  
The first conclusion of this paper is that an analysis of educational systems effects is 
flawed if it uses only a country- and a student-level. Additional school-and and track-within-
school-level is necessary in order to get reliable estimators of system- and individual-effects. 
Appendix D shows that the omission of the school- and track-within-schools-levels increases 
the amount of variance at the individual-level and at the country-level compared with four-
level models. Also the effects of the individual variables tend to be stronger in a two-level 
model than in a comparable four-level model. Especially the effects of parental ESCS are 
larger in a two-level approach than in the more correct four-level approach. Moreover the 
interactions between parental ESCS and educational systems characteristics are smaller in a 
two-level approach than in the more correct four-level approach. That is true both for native 
and immigrant students. Finally the fit of four-level models is far better than that of two-level 
models, which indicates that a two-level model gives a less adequate description of the 
relations between educational systems and educational achievement than a four-level model. 
As a consequence the outcomes of two-level models, which are still dominant in the study of 
effects of educational systems, are flawed.  
 
6.2 Partial confirmation of the earlier results by Dunne (2010). 
Our analysis confirmed the results of Dunne (2010) on the differential effects of 
parental background in different educational systems. The direct effect of parental ESCS is 
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strongest in comprehensive systems, and smaller in moderately and strongly stratified 
educational systems, also after inclusion of the track-level within the schools, the origin 
countries of immigrant students and the ethnic school-diversity.  
However, Dunne’s results on the effects of the average school ECSC are not 
confirmed. Without control for curriculum characteristics the effects of average school ECSC 
are significantly larger in more stratified systems for both populations. After control for 
curriculum characteristics however, the effects of average school ECSC in more stratified 
systems are no longer significant for the native population and only significantly larger for 
immigrant students in strongly stratified systems.  
 
6.3. Different effects of curriculum 
The inclusion of the track-level is necessary to avoid overestimation of the school-
composition effect, especially in stratified educational systems. Our results show that the 
effect of the track-level is absent in comprehensive educational system, while the effect is 
significant and positive in all stratified educational systems. In other words, the level of the 
curriculum makes sense in stratified educational systems. Table 3 shows the consequences of 
this distinction between track-levels. In a comprehensive system, the average reading score 
for native students is 483 for students at the lower track-level and 479 at the higher level. 
Note that the fact that there is no difference between the higher and lower level in the 
comprehensive system is a result of the fact that countries code their system differently (see 
section 3). In moderately stratified systems the scores are 467 and 488 and in strongly 
stratified systems 482 and 489. Attaining the higher track-level is thus important for 
educational achievement in the stratified systems. Not taking the track-level into account will 
give biased and flawed outcomes in analyses of effects of educational systems and school-
composition. The table shows that no educational system can claim to have the best results for 
all students, but that the results differ for natives and immigrants and for the track-level. For 
the native students at the lower track-level the best results are obtained in either the 
comprehensive or the strong stratified systems. For the immigrant students at this level the 
comprehensive system is clearly superior to the two others. For students at the higher level the 
situation is clearly different. The native students at this level have the highest achievements in 
the strong or moderately stratified systems, while the immigrant students get the best results 
only in the moderately stratified systems.  
 
6.4. A negative effect of vocational education? 
Students with a vocational oriented curriculum have lower reading scores than 
students in a general oriented curriculum, and it is not easy to explain that lower score by the 
social and cultural characteristics of these students, their schools or educational systems. 
Despite all control variables in model 6 of tables 1 and 2, students with a vocational oriented 
curriculum score 54 (immigrants) and 52 (natives) point lower than students in a general 
oriented curriculum. Appendix E shows that the differences in scores between students with a 
vocational oriented curriculum and students in a general oriented curriculum for math and 
science are more or less the same. These equal differences do not support their explanation as 
a consequence of a choice between more technical and cultural preferences and/or abilities of 
students. A possible explanation of these equal differences is that students in the general and 
vocational curriculum differ strongly in scholastic ability, and for that reason differ strongly 
on all school-tests, irrespective of their content (Rindermann & Ceci, 2009). Further analyses 
(not shown here) indicate that these lower scores of students with a vocational oriented 
curriculum occur in all educational systems, but that in moderately stratified systems these 
students score around 35 points lower than in the other systems (both populations). 
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6.5. Direct and indirect effects of parental background 
The direct effects of parental ECSC on reading scores are smaller in moderately and 
strongly stratified educational systems than in comprehensive systems. But the bivariate 
correlations between parental ECSC and reading scores are more or less equal in the three 
systems: natives 0.33, 0.36, 0.37; immigrants 0.36; 0.35; 0,39. The analogous partial 
correlations, controlled for ECSC school-composition, are 0.22, 0.11, 0.10; and 0.23, 0.14 and 
0.16 respectively. This difference between the bivariate correlations and partial correlations 
can be explained by the different bivariate correlations between parental ECSC and ECSC 
school-composition in the three educational systems: natives 0.48, 0.54, 0.61; immigrants 
0.47, 0.48, 0.49. In other words: the influence of parental ECSC on the selection of students 
into different tracks and schools is higher in stratified systems, because the long-term 
consequences of that selection are more severe than in comprehensive systems where there is 
no selection. Without having passed that selection into different schools and tracks the 
influence of parental ECSC is larger in comprehensive systems because the effect of social 
background has not yet been transformed into different tracking or ability grouping.  
 
6.6 The effects of origin for immigrant students and educational systems 
Estimates of effects of educational systems will be flawed if they do not take into 
account the different origin countries of immigrant students in different destination countries 
and the different levels of ethnic school-diversity in different destination countries. By not 
taking into account the countries of origin of immigrant students the positive effects of 
comprehensive systems will be overestimated because the Scandinavian countries with 
comprehensive systems have relatively few immigrant students originating from Islamic 
countries. Also the negative effects of strongly stratified systems will be overestimated by the 
non-inclusion of origin countries because Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland 
have relatively many immigrant students originating from Islamic countries. These flaws are 
made in influential OECD reports like Where Immigrant Students Succeed; A Comparative 
Review of Performance and Engagement in PISA 2003 (OECD, 2006), despite the fact that 
origin country is already available in PISA 2003. 
Immigrant students originating from Islamic countries have a lower educational 
achievement than equivalent immigrant children, originating from other countries. Multiple 
explanations may be proposed: a discriminating attitude towards immigrant students from 
Islamic countries; negative selectiveness of guest worker programmes, where most guest 
workers in Europe came from Islamic countries; values and standards of the current Islam 
which are less suitable for success in modern societies (honour, unequal gender roles). André, 
Dronkers and Fleischmann (2009) have used data from the European Social Survey (ESS)xv to 
show that the degree of subjective feelings of discrimination of immigrants in the EU with an 
Islamic religion is not greater than of Greek Orthodox or Jewish believers. Dronkers and Heus 
(2010a) have shown that the negative selectiveness of immigrants from Turkey is not greater 
than that from non-Islamic guest worker countries (Yugoslavia, Italy, Portugal). Dronkers and 
Fleischmann (2010) have shown on the basis of the same ESS data that second-generation 
male Islam believers in Europe obtain a lower educational level than comparable immigrants 
with different religions. We have also shown that the Islamic faith of individual immigrants 
leads to a lower educational level, not the fact of originating from a country with an Islamic 
majority.  
Immigrant students originating from Non-Islamic Asian countries have higher 
educational achievement than equivalent immigrant children, originating from other 
countries. The standard explanations for this advantage (working harder for education; 
authoritarian education system; the “ideal immigrant”) do not stand up empirically (see 
Dronkers & Heus, 2010b). Asia is therefore a much greater challenge for Europe in the field 
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of education than the US (see also Dronkers, 2010b). These earlier results are not changed by 
the improved measurement of the concrete school-environment and its characteristics by the 
track-within-school-level.  
 
6.7. Negative effect of ethnic school-diversity in different systems and populations  
Ethnic school-diversity has a negative effect on achievement scores, but only for 
immigrant students, not for natives. However, analyses (not shown here) show that the 
negative ethnic school-diversity effect for native students is significant in strongly stratified 
system and insignificant in the two other systems. The negative ethnic school-diversity effect 
does not vary between educational systems for immigrant students. This result partly 
contradicts the earlier outcomes by Dronkers (2010a) who found significant negative effects 
for both populations in moderately and strongly stratified educational systems. The most 
plausible explanation of this difference is the more relevant measurement of the ethnic 
diversity at the track-within-school-level instead of at the school-level. Measuring ethnic 
diversity at the school-level might pick up ethnic diversity between tracks instead of ethnic 
diversity within tracks. The improved measurement of the concrete school-environment and 
its characteristics by the tracks-within-school-level is only relevant for the more stratified 
systems. But regardless of the educational system, ethnic school-diversity has a negative 
effect on the educational performance of immigrant students, a result already found by 
Dronkers (2010a). The improved measurement of the concrete school-environment and its 
characteristics by the tracks-within-school-level has not changed that result. 
  
6.8. No effect of ESCS school-diversity 
ESCS school-diversity has no negative effect. ESCS school-diversity has only a 
positive significant effect in moderately stratified systems for immigrant students (additional 
analysis not shown here). ESCS school-diversity does not seem to be such an important factor 
for the improvement of educational performance, as sometimes suggested by policy-makers 
and educationalists.  
  
6.9. Caveats 
Finally we want to make two caveats in relation with our results. The first is a 
consequence of the need to control for the origin countries of the immigrant students in order 
to get a more correct estimation of the effects of educational systems. Doing so requires the 
inclusion of more destination countries, both inside and outside of Europe. Important 
countries to take into account would for instance be Canada, England, France and the USA. 
Only 16 of the OECD countries participating in PISA 2006 have asked sufficiently detailed 
information about the country of birth of students and their parents and very few additional 
countries have done that in PISA 2009. This is not only a drawback for the scientific analysis 
of the educational achievement of immigrant students, but it is also socially and politically 
irresponsible to deny or ignore the importance of origin countries (see for instance EU 
Commission, 2008).  
The second caveat is that the quality of the measurement of the level of the track 
students attend needs to be improved especially for countries with comprehensive educational 
systems (compare the levels of Scotland with that of Finland). Also the internal differentiation 
within schools (track, streams, etc) should be measured better.  
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Notes
                                                        
i If they are omitted from the analysis, the results might be misleading (Swedish and Russian immigrants in 
Finland with a comprehensive system and Turkish and Yugoslav immigrants in Germany with a strongly 
differentiated system can not be treated as the same immigrants, even after control for all measured background 
characteristics). 
ii This section is primarily based on Dunne (2010). 
iii We could not use the same countries because a number of them collected no information about the countries of 
birth of the students and their parents. 
iv The question on country of birth was not asked in a similar way in all countries. Most countries asked the 
country of origin for the main immigrant groups in the country concerned. In the German questionnaires, 
possible countries of origin were therefore: Russia, Former Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Poland and Turkey, while 
the Scottish questionnaire listed the options China, India, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and Europe. 
See also Levels, Dronkers & Kraaykamp (2008). 
v As PISA allows participating countries to determine the country of origin categories themselves, the level of 
detail differs among countries. As a result, the countries of origin that we have identified are dependent on the 
quality of the answer categories. To take this into consideration, we have compared the countries of origin that 
we defined with national statistics. In the case of Australia, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand and 
Switzerland, the three main groups of immigrants as listed by their national statistics, match countries of origin 
that we found. In the case of Belgium, Germany, Liechtenstein and Scotland, the two main groups as indicated 
by their national statistics, match the countries of origin identified by us. In Greece, the main group of foreign 
origin consists of Albanians (42 percent of all immigrants, Eurostat, 2008), and this also matches our data. The 
main group of foreign origin in Latvia concerns Russians (35 percent of all immigrants, Eurostat, 2008), and this 
is also reflected in our data. 
vi We also checked whether centering the track-level per country would solve this problem. The centered values 
are displayed in the last column of appendix B and the results of using centered values instead of the measured 
track-levels are shown in appendix F. In general the results do not change much, which is the reason why we 
decided to use the original track-levels.  
vii The measure consists of the presence of a desk, a private room, a quiet place to study, a computer, educational 
software, Internet, literature or poetry, art, books that may be of use when doing schoolwork, a dictionary, a 
dishwasher, and the presence of more than 100 books in the house. 
viii The number of immigrants’ children from Latin America is too small to justify a separate region.  
ix The Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity was calculated as follows: 1-((percentage of ethnic group 1)2 + 
(percentage of ethnic group 2)2 + … + (percentage of ethnic group n)2).  
x For the computation of the ethnic diversity we used the countries of origins, not the regions of origins. 
xi The groups are defined as follows: 1. Less than 10%: ESCS <= -1.1; 2. 10-30%: -1.0 < ESCS <= -0.4; 3. 30-
70%: -0.3 < ESCS < =0.6; 4. 70-90%: 0.7 < ESCS <= 1.2; 5. more than 90%: ESCS >= 1.3. 
xii The Herfindahl index of socio-cultural diversity was calculated as follows: 1-((percentage of parents from 
ESCS group 1) 2 + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 2) 2 + … + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 
5) 2).  
xiii The separate analysis of the native and immigrant students is already a departure of the standard approach, 
which does not distinguish between these students, despite the fact that they are unequally distributed among the 
countries in the analysis. 
xiv For an overview of the underlying parameters, see appendices G and H. 
xv The ESS contains information about the individual religion of the respondents. 
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Table 1: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school characteristics, 
educational systems characteristics on reading score of native students (N countries=15; N 
schools=2861; N tracks= 3311; N students= 72329) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 498.8 
(5.3) 
543.5 
(60.0) 
453.8 
(64.3) 
501.8 
(70.7) 
478.5 
(62.4) 
482.6 
(59.9) 
483.4 
(59.8) 
Individual characteristics        
Parental ESCS  28.2** 
(0.5) 
27.3** 
(0.5) 
28.6** 
(0.5) 
27.2** 
(0.5) 
27.2** 
(0.5) 
27.4** 
(0.6) 
Female  30.9** 
(0.5) 
30.8** 
(0.5) 
30.6** 
(0.5) 
30.6** 
(0.5) 
30.6** 
(0.5) 
30.6** 
(0.5) 
Grade (destination country 
centered) 
 42.9** 
(0.7) 
40.4** 
(0.7) 
41.8** 
(0.7) 
41.2** 
(0.7) 
41.1** 
(0.7) 
41.1** 
(0.7) 
School-composition 
characteristics at track-within-
school 
       
Average ESCS   50.2** 
(3.1) 
 49.1** 
(2.9) 
45.9** 
(3.1) 
46.1** 
(3.1) 
% students from Eastern Europe 
(ref=% native students) 
  -0.1 (0.2)  -0.1 (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) 
% students from non-Islam Asia 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.8** 
(0.3) 
 0.7** 
(0.2) 
0.5** 
(0.2) 
0.5** 
(0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.2 (0.2)  0.0 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2) 
% students from western OECD 
countries (ref=% native students) 
  -0.5** 
(0.2) 
 -0.3 (0.2) -0.3 (0.2) -0.3 (0.2) 
% students from Sub-Saharan 
Africa (ref=% native students) 
  -0.6 (0.4)  -0.5 (0.4) -0.5 (0.4) -0.5 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity    19.5** 
(7.9) 
 -2.1 (7.2) -3.5 (7.2) -5.9 (7.3) 
Ethnic diversity   -17.7 
(11.5) 
 -17.4 
(10.8) 
-16.0 
(10.9) 
-16.2 
(10.9) 
Curriculum at track-within-
school 
       
Vocational (ref=general)    -72.3** 
(2.2) 
-52.6** 
(2.4) 
-52.4** 
(2.4) 
-52.4** 
(2.4) 
Higher secondary (ref=lower)    -0.6 (2.9) -4.2 (2.9) -4.1 (2.9) -4.2 (2.9) 
Selective admittance (ref= Some 
selective admittance) 
   21.5** 
(2.7) 
17.5** 
(2.3) 
16.3** 
(2.3) 
16.4** 
(2.3) 
Non selective admittance (ref= 
Some selective admittance) 
   -5.8** 
(1.9)  
-0.8 (1.7) -2.3 (1.6) -2.3 (1.6) 
School characteristics        
Teacher shortage      -4.8** 
(0.8) 
-4.8** 
(0.8) 
Student/staff ratio      0.5** 
(0.2) 
0.5** 
(0.2) 
School in city (ref=towns)      -1.8 (1.9) -1.8 (1.9) 
School in rural (ref=towns)      5.6** 
(1.7) 
5.6** 
(1.7) 
School-size*100      1.3** 
(0.2) 
1.4** 
(0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=Public 
school) 
     -7.5** 
(2.5) 
-7.4** 
(2.5) 
Private independent (ref=Public 
school) 
     -9.5** 
(4.0) 
-9.1** 
(4.0) 
Educational system 
characteristics 
       
Strongly stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
 -23.6 
(18.1) 
12.5 
(20.4) 
-23.2 
(22.4) 
5.0 (19.8) -2.4 
(18.9) 
-1.9 
(18.9) 
Moderately stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
 -22.3 
(13.1)
-13.5 
(14.8)
-45.5** 
(16.6)
-19.3 
(14.7)
-17.2 
(14.1) 
-16.8 
(14.1)
Age of selection  -3.5 (3.5) 0.8 (4.0) -0.7 (4.4) -0.3 (3.9) -0.7 (3.7) -0.7 (3.7) 
Interactions with educational 
system 
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Parental ESCS* strongly stratified  -15.1** 
(0.8) 
-16.1** 
(0.8) 
-15.8** 
(0.8) 
-16.2** 
(0.8) 
-16.2** 
(0.8) 
-16.4** 
(0.8) 
Parental ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
 -14.1** 
(0.9)
-15.8** 
(0.8)
-15.4** 
(0.9)
-15.8** 
(0.9)
-15.8** 
(0.9) 
-15.9** 
(0.9)
Average ESCS* strongly stratified   4.2 (3.9)  -5.8 (3.7) -2.4 (3.7) -2.6 (3.7) 
Average ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
  28.2** 
(4.4) 
 2.8 (4.3) 6.5 (4.3) 6.4 (4.3) 
Higher secondary* strongly 
stratified 
   34.2** 
(3.9) 
13.6** 
(4.0) 
12.1** 
(3.9) 
11.9** 
(3.9) 
Higher secondary* moderately 
stratified 
   59.3** 
(8.4) 
26.2** 
(8.2) 
25.4** 
(8.1) 
25.1** 
(8.1) 
Reproduction         
Parental ESCS* average ESCS       -1.1* 
(0.6) 
Variation        
Individual-level 5090.6 
(27.4) 
4447.3 
(23.9) 
4446.4 
(23.9) 
4448.0 
(23.9) 
4448.2 
(23.9) 
4447.7 
(23.9) 
4447.3 
(23.9) 
Track-within-school-level 2288.2 
(165.2) 
947.0 
(83.8) 
562.4 
(58.4) 
309.4 
(42.9) 
312.5 
(42.4) 
308.4 
(41.9) 
307.7 
(41.9) 
School-level 1221.2 
(169.4) 
1229.9 
(96.3) 
733.1 
(65.4) 
1258.8 
(60.9) 
796.1 
(51.5) 
756.6 
(50.3) 
759.0 
(50.4) 
Country-level 391.8 
(154.8) 
258.2 
(102.3) 
336.8 
(128.9) 
401.2 
(153.4) 
309.3 
(118.5) 
280.4 
(107.3) 
279.6 
(107.1) 
Log likelihood 831363 820492 819109 819436 818579 818470 818466 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation 
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Table 2: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school characteristics, 
educational systems characteristics on reading score of immigrant students (N origin=35; N 
destination=15; N tracks=1960; N students=8521) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Constant 470.6 
(8.2) 
502.0 
(46.2) 
446.4 
(43.3) 
488.3 
(45.2) 
465.2 
(43.6) 
457.5 
(44.2) 
457.7 
(44.2) 
Individual characteristics        
Parental ESCS  32.9** 
(2.0) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
33.4** 
(2.0) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
24.9** 
(2.1) 
25.0** 
(2.1) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 -7.0 (7.4) -10.1 (7.1) -5.9 (6.9) -6.8 (6.8) -8.2 (6.8) -8.2 (6.8) 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 35.3** 
(11.2) 
17.2 
(10.5) 
32.2** 
(10.5) 
18.8* 
(10.2) 
18.7* 
(10.2) 
18.6* 
(10.2) 
Islamic countries origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 -38.2** 
(9.3) 
-35.7** 
(8.8) 
-38.9** 
(8.7) 
-35.1** 
(8.4) 
-35.3** 
(8.4) 
-35.3** 
(8.4) 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
 -22.7 
(16.0) 
-13.9 
(14.9) 
-25.6* 
(14.9) 
-15.8 
(14.3) 
-15.0 
(14.2) 
-15.0 
(14.2) 
Female  30.6** 
(1.7) 
29.9** 
(1.6) 
28.5** 
(1.7) 
28.5** 
(1.6) 
28.6** 
(1.6) 
28.6** 
(1.6) 
Home language same as in 
destination country 
 26.1** 
(2.3)
24.3** 
(2.2)
25.5** 
(2.2)
24.2** 
(2.2)
24.2** 
(2.2) 
24.2** 
(2.2)
One parent migrant, other parent 
native 
 4.8 (4.0) 6.1 (3.8) 4.8 (3.9) 5.4 (3.8) 5.8 (3.8) 5.8 (3.8) 
Second generation migrant  9.2** 
(1.9) 
9.7** 
(1.9) 
8.5** 
(1.9) 
9.3** 
(1.8) 
9.4** 
(1.8) 
9.3** 
(1.8) 
Grade (destination country 
centered) 
 40.5** 
(1.6) 
32.3** 
(1.6) 
35.1** 
(1.9) 
32.3** 
(1.8) 
31.8** 
(1.8) 
31.8** 
(1.8) 
School-composition 
characteristics at track-within-
school 
       
Average ESCS   49.8** 
(4.8) 
 49.0** 
(4.7) 
46.8** 
(5.1) 
46.9** 
(5.1) 
% students from Eastern Europe 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.3 (0.2)  0.3 (0.2) 0.4** 
(0.2) 
0.4** 
(0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia 
(ref=% native students) 
  1.4** 
(0.2) 
 1.3** 
(0.2) 
1.2** 
(0.2) 
1.2** 
(0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries 
(ref=% native students) 
  0.2 (0.1)  0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 
% students from Western OECD 
countries (ref=% native students) 
  -0.1 (0.1)  0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 
% students from Sub-Saharan 
Africa (ref=% native students) 
  -0.2 (0.4)  -0.1 (0.4) -0.2 (0.4) -0.2 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity    45.5** 
(14.1) 
 22.9 
(13.9) 
20.4 
(13.9) 
20.0 
(14.0) 
Ethnic diversity    -36.1** 
(11.4) 
 -36.9** 
(11.0) 
-40.1** 
(11.2) 
-40.3** 
(11.2) 
Curriculum at track-within-
school 
       
Vocational (ref=general)    -85.8** 
(4.5)
-54.5** 
(4.6)
-54.1** 
(4.6) 
-54.1** 
(4.6)
Higher secondary (ref=lower)    -0.5 (5.2) 0.5 (4.9) -0.7 (4.9) -0.8 (4.9) 
Selective admittance (ref= Some 
selective admittance) 
   21.4** 
(3.0) 
17.7** 
(2.7) 
18.0** 
(2.8) 
18.0** 
(2.8) 
Non selective admittance (ref= 
Some selective admittance) 
   0.2 (2.6) 2.2 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) 
School characteristics        
Teacher shortage      -1.6 (1.1) -1.6 (1.1) 
Student/staff ratio      0.8** 
(0.3) 
0.8** 
(0.3) 
School in city (ref=towns)      2.7 (2.7) 2.7 (2.7) 
School in rural (ref=towns)      2.7 (2.7) 2.7 (2.7) 
School-size*100      0.7** 0.7** 
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(0.2) (0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=Public 
school) 
     -5.0 (3.7) -4.9 (3.7) 
Private independent (ref=Public 
school) 
     -6.6 (5.4) -6.4 (5.4) 
Educational system 
characteristics 
       
Strongly stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
 -28.8* 
(15.4) 
-9.6 (14.4) -41.1** 
(15.0) 
-15.4 
(14.4) 
-16.7 
(14.5) 
-16.7 
(14.5) 
Moderately stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
 -25.3* 
(13.6) 
-10.3 
(12.6) 
-41.1** 
(13.6) 
-20.1 
(13.0) 
-16.7 
(13.1) 
-16.7 
(13.1) 
Age of selection  -3.1 (2.8) -1.8 (2.6) -2.1 (2.8) -2.1 (2.6) -2.3 (2.6) -2.3 (2.6) 
Interactions with educational 
systems 
       
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified  -16.1** 
(2.4) 
-16.5** 
(2.5) 
-18.5** 
(2.3) 
-16.5** 
(2.4) 
-16.4** 
(2.4) 
-16.5** 
(2.5) 
Parental ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
 -14.1** 
(3.2) 
-15.8** 
(3.3) 
-21.5** 
(3.2) 
-16.3** 
(3.3) 
-16.3** 
(3.3) 
-16.5** 
(3.3) 
Average ESCS* strongly stratified   29.8** 
(5.9)
 18.1** 
(5.9)
19.6** 
(6.1) 
19.5** 
(6.2)
Average ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
  18.4** 
(7.7) 
 -11.8 
(8.0) 
-10.8 
(8.3) 
-11.0 
(8.3) 
Higher secondary* strongly 
stratified 
   53.1** 
(6.7) 
16.1** 
(6.5) 
16.1** 
(6.5) 
16.3** 
(6.5) 
Higher secondary* moderately 
stratified 
   49.1** 
(10.1) 
31.3** 
(9.8) 
32.8** 
(9.8) 
32.7** 
(9.8) 
Reproduction         
Parental ESCS* average ESCS       -0.5 (1.8) 
Variation        
Individual-level 5034.3 
(104.9)
4599.5 
(94.1)
4506.7 
(89.8)
4547.0 
(91.8)
4520.7 
(89.1)
4516.2 
(89.0) 
4516.2 
(89.0)
Track-within-school-level 3338.4 
(155.9) 
1941.0 
(114.2) 
1129.0 
(89.6) 
1481.4 
(100.7) 
931.5 
(83.4) 
917.3 
(82.8) 
917.1 
(82.8) 
Origin-country-level 1875.4 
(256.9) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
384.9 
(1719.4) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
 000.0 
(00.0) 
 000.0 
(00.0) 
Destination-country-level 000.0 
(00.0) 
581.4 
(120.7) 
112.6 
(1718.0) 
504.2 
(104.5) 
455.7 
(93.6) 
444.8 
(91.8) 
444.6 
(91.7) 
Log likelihood 100118 98448 97536 97951 97339 97315 97314 
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Table 3: Summary of the different effects of parental ESCS, average ESCS school-
composition, and track-level in different educational systems.  
 First generation immigrant students from 
Western OECD countries 
Native students 
 Comprehensive Moderately  Strongly Comprehensive Moderately  Strongly
Average  457.7 441.0 441.0 483.4 466.6 481.5
Parental 
ESCS 
25.0 8.5 8.5 27.4 11.5 11.0
School 
ESCS 
46.9 35.9 63.2 46.1 52.5 43.5
Track-
level 
-0.8 31.9 15.5 -4.2 20.9 7.7
Source: PISA 2006; own computation. The average scores of the immigrant students from Eastern-Europe, non-Islam Asia, 
Islamic countries and Sub-Saharan African countries can be found by changing the scores for the Western OECD immigrants 
with -8.2, +18.6, -35.3 and -15.0 respectively. The average scores of second-generation immigrant students should be 
changed with +9.3, of those who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2 and those with mixed parents 
with +5.8. 
 
  29
Table 4: Estimation of educational performance of first generation immigrants from Western 
OECD countries and native students with lowest and highest parental ESCS, in schools with 
lowest and highest ESCS composition and with different track-level in the three educational 
systems, based on models 6 of tables 1 and 2. 
 
School 
ECSC 
composition 
lowest parent  
ECSC & 
vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC & 
vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC & 
general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC & 
general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC & 
general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC & 
general 
& higher 
First generation immigrants students from Western OECD-countries 
Comprehensive Lowest  199 385 246 439 254 447 
 Highest  374 553 428 607 427 606 
Moderately Lowest  259 323 307 378 346 416 
 Highest  412 469 466 523 498 555 
Strongly  Lowest  214 278 262 332 277 348 
 Highest  462 519 516 573 532 588 
Native students 
Comprehensive Lowest  218 428 271 481 267 477 
 Highest  416 593 469 646 464 641 
Moderately  Lowest  283 370 335 423 331 418 
 Highest  505 560 558 612 553 608 
Strongly  Lowest  306 390 359 442 359 422 
 Highest  494 545 546 597 546 597 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation. The average scores of the immigrant students from Eastern-Europe, non-Islam Asia, 
Islamic countries and Sub-Saharan African countries can be found by changing the scores for the Western OECD immigrants 
with -8.2, +18.6, -35.3 and -15.0 respectively. The average scores of second-generation immigrant students should be 
changed with +9.3, of those who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2 and those with mixed parents 
with +5.8. 
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Appendix A: descriptive statistics for native and immigrant students separately 
 Native students Immigrant students 
 Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
Science 107,74 825,65 517,4749 91,42546 130,30 841,04 468,6504 103,36225
Math 81,55 804,63 516,2721 87,44408 154,92 790,07 479,8127 94,65479 
Reading 81,02 800,16 505,7618 91,74740 67,34 775,21 462,9986 102,80869
Average ESCS school  -2,19 1,69 ,1445 ,50278 -2,07 1,64 ,0345 ,50160 
Diversity ESCS ,00 ,80 ,6511 ,08432 ,00 ,79 ,6635 ,07145 
Diversity Ethnic ,00 ,84 ,1315 ,16457 ,03 ,84 ,4149 ,19621 
% Western OECD  ,00 91,80 3,6089 7,63365 ,00 100,00 14,7488 18,62151 
% Eastern Europe  ,00 66,67 2,2934 5,70455 ,00 66,67 7,9945 12,80759 
% Islamic countries  ,00 92,31 1,2043 4,25382 ,00 92,31 5,9732 13,45775 
% non-Islamic Asia  ,00 83,33 ,7722 3,35355 ,00 87,50 2,5286 8,11845
% Sub-Saharan Africa ,00 33,33 ,2849 1,38090 ,00 33,33 1,1262 3,09810 
Vocational orientation of 
school 
,00 1,00 ,0678 ,25148 ,00 1,00 ,0817 ,27389 
Level of track ,00 1,00 ,3900 ,48756 ,00 1,00 ,3441 ,47506 
Level of track centered -1,00 1,00 -,1227 ,88899 -1,00 1,00 -,2881 ,90094 
School size 9 4468 682,67 447,172 23 4468 845,77 629,165 
Teacher-student ratio ,889 36,588 11,79027 3,738107 ,889 36,588 11,69007 3,942775 
Teacher shortage -1,0568 3,6194 ,088128 ,9539011 -1,0568 3,6194 ,287914 ,9777337 
School in rural area ,00 1,00 ,3944 ,48872 ,00 1,00 ,2949 ,45603 
School in city ,00 1,00 ,2594 ,43831 ,00 1,00 ,3717 ,48328 
School admittance not 
selective 
,00 1,00 ,4298 ,48725 ,00 1,00 ,2732 ,44011 
School admittance selective ,00 1,00 ,1437 ,34489 ,00 1,00 ,2259 ,41509 
Private independent school ,00 1,00 ,0443 ,20575 ,00 1,00 ,0501 ,21819 
Private dependent school ,00 1,00 ,2564 ,43663 ,00 1,00 ,2402 ,42725 
Public school ,00 1,00 ,6993 ,45855 ,00 1,00 ,7097 ,45395 
Female ,00 1,00 ,4984 ,50000 ,00 1,00 ,5008 ,50003 
ECSC  -4,3905 3,3487 ,175748 ,8911239 -4,4421 2,9709 -,232409 1,0159425
Immigrant first generation     ,00 1,00 ,4605 ,49847 
Immigrant second generation     ,00 1,00 ,5003 ,50003 
Mixed marriage     ,00 1,00 ,0563 ,23057 
Eastern Europe     ,00 1,00 ,2746 ,44635 
Western OECD     ,00 1,00 ,4538 ,49789 
Islamic country     ,00 1,00 ,1620 ,36843 
Non-Islamic Asia     ,00 1,00 ,0908 ,28739 
Sub-Saharan Africa     ,00 1,00 ,0354 ,18490 
Language of destination     ,00 1,00 ,4995 ,50003 
Grade (destination country 
centered) 
-2,00 3,00 ,5924 ,80276 -2,00 3,00 ,3732 ,87115 
Strongly stratified system ,00 1,00 ,3493 ,47677 ,00 1,00 ,5645 ,49585 
Moderately stratified system ,00 1,00 ,2237 ,41672 ,00 1,00 ,1402 ,34726 
Age of first selection 10,00 16,00 14,0619 2,19505 10,00 16,00 13,2238 2,08364 
Valid N 72329    8521    
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix B: The number of schools and number of tracks-within-schools and the number of 
students in these tracks-within-schools (Number of students of track-within-school >5)  
Country Level N 
tracks-
within-
schools 
Minimum N 
students per 
track-within-
school 
Maximum N 
students per 
track-within-
school 
Average N 
students per 
track-
within-
school 
Level  
centered per 
country and 
general/ 
vocational 
Australia  lower general 345 6 56 31,87 -1  
 higher general 133 6 33 16,37 + 1 
 higher vocational 10 6 19 9,10 0 
Austria  lower general 11 6 26 9,64 -1  
 higher general 88 6 35 29,51 + 1 
 higher vocational 79 8 38 26,06 0 
Belgium  lower general 8 6 18 8,50 -1  
 lower vocational 12 6 29 14,33 -1  
 higher general 250 6 161 26,76 + 1 
 higher vocational 113 6 66 12,64 + 1 
Switzerland  lower general 458 6 175 23,61 -1  
 higher general 37 6 34 16,57 + 1 
 higher vocational 17 6 33 15,94 0 
Germany  lower vocational 3 9 17 10,0 -1 
 lower general 118 9 25 20,20 0 
 higher vocational 5 8 25 15,40 0 
 higher general 96 6 25 20,59 +1 
Denmark  lower general 201 6 28 21,64 -1  
 higher general 2 6 7 6,50 + 1 
Finland  lower general 154 7 35 30,24 0 
Scotland  higher general 98 9 34 23,84 0 
Greece  lower general 11 6 27 11,64 -1  
 higher general 125 8 35 30,66 + 1 
 higher vocational 29 7 34 23,93 0 
Liechtenstein  lower general 11 6 77 27,18 -1  
 higher general 2 11 26 18,50 + 1 
Luxembourg  lower general 28 11 205 96,71 -1  
 higher general 27 6 125 49,33 + 1 
 higher vocational 14 6 32 16,64 0 
Latvia  lower general 171 7 35 26,25 0 
 higher vocational 7 6 21 9,86 0 
Norway  lower general 191 6 30 23,28 -1  
 higher general 1 7 7 7,00 + 1 
New Zealand  lower general 3 6 12 9,00 -1  
 higher general 168 10 50 24,43 + 1 
Portugal  lower general 123 6 37 16,41 -1  
 lower vocational 6 6 17 9,83 -1  
 higher general 111 6 37 18,14 + 1 
 higher vocational 47 6 34 9,57 + 1 
Total Natives Schools 2861   
 Tracks-within-
schools 
3311   
Immigrants Schools 1756   
 Tracks-within-
schools 
1960   
Source: PISA 2006; own computations. 
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Appendix C. Average reading score of immigrant students per country of destination and 
country of origin (N=8521) 
Destination countries 
Origin countries AU AT BE CH DE DK EL FI LI LU LV NO NZ PT SC Mean 
Albania  422  353   433  312       399 
Australia             551   551 
Austria    478     534       501 
Bangladesh               453 453 
Belarus           486     486 
Belgium          521      521 
Bosnia Herzegovina  457   459 445          454 
Brazil              466  466 
Cap Verde          368      368 
China 544 574           538 456 461 539 
Congo   437             437 
Croatia  469   432           459 
Czech republic  560              560 
Denmark            394    394 
Estonia        485        485 
France   452 504     439 493      485 
Germany  525 502 530     529 520      519 
Greece     412           412 
Hungary  567              567 
India 539              494 538 
Italy    451 410    447 432      443 
Korea 499            512   506 
Liechtenstein    464            464 
Macedonia  401   413           403 
Morocco   442             442 
Netherlands   489             489 
New Zealand 498               498 
Pakistan      408         446 423 
Philippines 512               512 
Poland  532 430  488           469 
Portugal    460     450 416      426 
Romania  444              444 
Russia     462   562   463     472 
Samoa             443   443 
Serbia Montenegro  430  427 397   413        426 
Slovakia  515              515 
Slovenia  428   447           432 
South Africa 527               527 
Spain    467     517       469 
Sweden        497    451    462 
Switzerland         501       501 
Turkey  386 411 433 400 398   359       408 
Ukraine           447     447 
United Kingdom 523            554   532 
United States 559               559 
Vietnam 505               505 
Mean immigrants 523 445 451 444 430 412 433 532 482 440 465 429 520 465 456 463 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation 
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Appendix D: The effects of individual characteristics and educational systems characteristics 
(model 6 in tables 1 and 2) on reading scores of immigrant and native students in analyses 
with 4 or 2 levels. 
 Immigrant students Native students 
 Model 1; 4 
levels 
Model 1; 2 
levels 
Only ESCS 
& female 
Model 1; 4 
levels 
Model 1; 2 
levels 
Only ESCS 
& female 
Constant 502.0 
(46.2) 
478.9 
(75.8) 
465.8 (9.7) 543.5 
(60.0) 
559.1 
(58.4) 
482.1 (7.2) 
Individual characteristics       
Parental ESCS 32.9** 
(2.0) 
39.1** 
(2.0) 
40.7** (1.9)  28.2** 
(0.5) 
37.9** 
(0.6) 
39.7** (0.6) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
-7.0 (7.4) -9.8** 
(3.0) 
- - - - 
Non-Islam Asia origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
35.3** 
(11.2) 
35.1** 
(3.9) 
- - - - 
Islamic countries origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
-38.2** 
(9.3) 
-33.4** 
(3.3) 
- - - - 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref= 
Western OECD countries) 
-22.7 
(16.0) 
-22.1** 
(5.0) 
- - - - 
Female 30.6** 
(1.7) 
31.7** 
(1.8)
36.2** (1.9) 30.9** 
(0.5)
35.7** 
(0.6) 
39.2** (0.6) 
Home language same as in 
destination country 
26.1** 
(2.3) 
26.8** 
(2.2) 
- - - - 
One parent migrant, other parent 
native 
4.8 (4.0) 8.9** (4.1) - - - - 
Second generation migrant 9.2** (1.9) 7.9** (2.0) - - - - 
Grade (destination country 
centered) 
40.5** 
(1.6) 
46.0** 
(1.6) 
- 42.9** 
(0.7) 
48.4** 
(0.6) 
- 
Educational system 
characteristics 
      
Strongly stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
-28.8* 
(15.4) 
-19.4 
(24.4) 
-21.4 (13.5) -23.6 
(18.1) 
-20.0 
(18.5) 
-0.5 (10.3) 
Moderately stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
-25.3* 
(13.6) 
-8.5 (17.7) -32.2* (16.4) -22.3 
(13.1) 
-20.3 
(13.4) 
-12.8 (12.5) 
Age of selection -3.1 (2.8) -2.2 (4.7) - -3.5 (3.5) -4.7 (3.6) - 
Interactions with educational 
systems 
      
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified -16.1** 
(2.4) 
-14.4** 
(2.3) 
-2.3 (2.5) -15.1** 
(0.8) 
-10.9** 
(0.8) 
-5.5** (0.9)  
Parental ESCS* moderately 
stratified 
-14.1** 
(3.2) 
-16.2** 
(3.1) 
-5.9 (3.3) -14.1** 
(0.9) 
-5.9** 
(0.9) 
3.7** (0.9)  
Variation       
Individual-level 4599.5 
(94.1) 
6687.1 
(102.5) 
7762.6 
(119.1) 
4447.3 
(23.9) 
6152.3 
(34.4) 
6707.3 
(35.3) 
Track-within-school-level 1941.0 
(114.2) 
- - 947.0 
(83.8) 
- - 
School-level - - - 1229.9 
(96.3) 
- - 
Origin-country-level 000.0 
(00.0) 
- - - - - 
Destination-country-level 581.4 
(120.7) 
439.2 
(176.6) 
458.3 
(195.9) 
258.2 
(102.3) 
287.1 
(106.0) 
313.4 
(116.0) 
Log likelihood 98448 99279 100549 820492 836379 842626 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation 
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 Appendix E: The effects of individual characteristics, track characteristics, school 
characteristics, educational systems characteristics (model 6) on reading, math and science 
scores of immigrant and native students. 
 Immigrant students Native students 
 Reading Math Science Reading Math Science 
Constant 457.7 
(44.2) 
502.9 
(38.4) 
553.6 
(44.2) 
483.4 
(59.8) 
573.4 
(66.5) 
692.8 
(65.0) 
Individual characteristics       
Parental ESCS 25.0** 
(2.1)
22.4** 
(1.9)
24.7** 
(2.1)
27.4** 
(0.6)
25.5** 
(0.5) 
28.8** 
(0.6)
Eastern Europe origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
-8.2 (6.8) -15.9** 
(5.9) 
-11.1 (6.8) - - - 
Non-Islam Asia origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
18.6* 
(10.2) 
27.7** 
(8.8) 
19.1 (10.2) - - - 
Islamic countries origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
-35.3** 
(8.4) 
-31.9** 
(7.2) 
-36.0** 
(8.4) 
- - - 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
-15.0 
(14.2) 
-18.1 
(12.1) 
-14.3 
(14.3) 
- - - 
Female 28.6** 
(1.6) 
-20.7** 
(1.5) 
-9.9** 
(1.6) 
30.6** 
(0.5) 
-19.3** 
(0.5) 
-8.9** 
(0.6) 
Home language same as in destination 
country 
24.2** 
(2.2) 
16.2** 
(2.0) 
23.0** 
(2.2) 
- - - 
One parent migrant, other parent native 5.8 (3.8) 5.9 (3.5) 10.2** 
(3.8) 
- - - 
Second generation migrant 9.3** (1.8) 8.0** 
(1.7) 
7.5** (1.9) - - - 
Grade (destination country centered) 31.8** 
(1.8) 
33.6** 
(1.7) 
31.7** 
(1.8) 
41.1** 
(0.7) 
42.0** 
(0.7) 
39.2** 
(0.7) 
School-composition characteristics at 
track-within-school 
      
Average ESCS 46.9** 
(5.1) 
43.5** 
(4.7) 
50.5** 
(5.1) 
46.1** 
(3.1) 
42.2** 
(2.8) 
45.9** 
(2.8) 
% students from Eastern Europe (ref=% 
native students) 
0.4** (0.2) 0.3** 
(0.1) 
0.3* (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia 
(ref=% native students) 
1.2** (0.2) 1.2** 
(0.2) 
1.3** (0.2) 0.5** 
(0.2) 
0.8** 
(0.2) 
0.6** (0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries 
(ref=% native students) 
0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.2) -0.2 (0.1) -0.1 (0.2) 
% students from western OECD 
countries (ref=% native students) 
0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.2* (0.1) -0.3 (0.2) -0.2 (0.1) -0.1 (0.2) 
% students from Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ref=% native students) 
-0.2 (0.4) 0.0 (0.4) -0.2 (0.4) -0.5 (0.4) -0.2 (0.4) -0.3 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity  20.0 (14.0) 17.0 
(13.0) 
23.1 (13.9) -5.9 (7.3) 0.3 (6.8) 4.7 (6.8) 
Ethnic diversity  -40.3** 
(11.2) 
-34.4** 
(10.4) 
-42.6** 
(11.0) 
-16.2 
(10.9) 
-30.6** 
(10.1) 
-27.4** 
(10.2) 
Curriculum at track-within-school       
Vocational (ref=general) -54.1** 
(4.6)
-52.4** 
(4.3)
-50.1** 
(4.5)
-52.4** 
(2.4)
-51.1** 
(2.3) 
-51.9** 
(2.3)
Higher secondary (ref=lower) -0.8 (4.9) -0.4 (4.5) 0.9 (4.9) -4.2 (2.9) -3.7 (2.8) -4.2 (2.8) 
Selective admittance (ref= Some 
selective admittance) 
18.0** 
(2.8) 
18.9** 
(2.6) 
19.5** 
(2.7) 
16.4** 
(2.3) 
18.4** 
(2.1) 
18.4** 
(2.1) 
Non selective admittance (ref= Some 
selective admittance) 
1.0 (2.4) 1.2 (2.2) 0.8 (2.4) -2.3 (1.6) -0.9 (1.5) -1.6 (1.5) 
School characteristics       
Teacher shortage -1.6 (1.1) -2.6** 
(1.0) 
-1.5 (1.1) -4.8** 
(0.8) 
-4.2** 
(0.7) 
-4.1** 
(0.7) 
Student/staff ratio 0.8** (0.3) 0.3 (0.3) 0.3 (0.3) 0.5** 
(0.2) 
0.4** 
(0.2) 
0.3 (0.2) 
School in city (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) -0.3 (2.5) 1.5 (2.7) -1.8 (1.9) -2.8 (1.8) -2.7 (1.7) 
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School in rural (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 4.1 (2.5) 5.9** (2.6) 5.6** 
(1.7) 
6.6** 
(1.6) 
7.8** (1.5) 
School-size*100 0.7** (0.2) 0.7** 
(0.2)
0.6** (0.2) 1.4** 
(0.2)
1.0** 
(0.2)  
1.0** (0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=Public school) -4.9 (3.7) -10.7** 
(3.4) 
-6.0* (3.6) -7.4** 
(2.5) 
-4.9** 
(2.2) 
-3.6** 
(2.2) 
Private independent (ref=Public school) -6.4 (5.4) --10.3** 
(5.0) 
-4.5 (5.4) -9.1** 
(4.0) 
-6.3 (3.6) -5.7 (3.5) 
Educational system characteristics       
Strongly stratified (ref= Comprehensive) -16.7 
(14.5) 
-17.0 
(12.5) 
-43.9** 
(14.5) 
-1.9 (18.9) -13.4 
(21.0) 
-24.8 
(20.5) 
Moderately stratified (ref= 
Comprehensive) 
-16.7 
(13.1) 
-16.0 
(11.4) 
-28.2** 
(13.1) 
-16.8 
(14.1) 
-10.6 
(15.5) 
-17.1 
(15.2) 
Age of selection -2.3 (2.6) -1.8 (2.3) -6.1** 
(2.6) 
-0.7 (3.7) -4.6 (4.1) -5.9 (4.0) 
Interactions with educational systems       
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified -16.5** 
(2.5) 
-14.0** 
(2.3) 
-14.3** 
(2.5) 
-16.4** 
(0.8) 
-15.6** 
(0.7) 
-17.4** 
(0.8) 
Parental ESCS* moderately stratified -16.5** 
(3.3)
-17.3** 
(3.1)
-15.9** 
(3.3)
-15.9** 
(0.9)
-10.8** 
(0.8) 
-13.7** 
(0.9)
Average ESCS* strongly stratified 19.5** 
(6.2) 
18.4** 
(5.7) 
10.1 (6.1) -2.6 (3.7) -3.8 (3.4) -8.7** 
(3.4) 
Average ESCS* moderately stratified -11.0 (8.3) -5.8 (7.7) -17.7** 
(8.3) 
6.4 (4.3) 2.1 (4.0) 0.4 (3.9) 
Higher secondary* strongly stratified 16.3** 
(6.5) 
11.4* 
(6.0) 
13.0** 
(6.4) 
11.9** 
(3.9) 
16.0** 
(3.8) 
18.2** 
(3.8) 
Higher secondary* moderately stratified 32.7** 
(9.8) 
27.8** 
(9.0) 
20.3** 
(9.7) 
25.1** 
(8.1) 
17.1** 
(7.7) 
6.6 (7.8) 
Reproduction        
Parental ESCS* average ESCS -0.5 (1.8) 3.5** 
(1.6) 
3.1** (1.8) -1.1* (0.6) 1.5** 
(0.6) 
1.6** (0.6) 
Variation       
Individual-level 4516.2 
(89.0) 
3904.3 
(76.9) 
4663.7 
(91.0) 
4447.3 
(23.9) 
4077.0 
(21.9) 
5000.0 
(26.9) 
Track-within-school-level 917.1 
(82.8)
792.0 
(71.6)
793.2 
(80.2)
307.7 
(41.9)
307.2 
(39.5) 
268.0 
(40.6)
School-level  - - - 759.0 
(50.4) 
552.3 
(44.6) 
513.3 
(44.9) 
Origin-country-level 000.0 
(00.0) 
000.0 
(00.0) 
291.4 
(1640.2) 
- - - 
Destination-country-level 444.6 
(91.7) 
312.0 
(67.0) 
159.0 
(1639.6) 
279.6 
(107.1) 
354.1 
(133.6) 
337.2 
(127.2) 
Log likelihood 97314 96060 97415 818466 811887 825911 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation 
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Appendix F: The effects of individual characteristics and educational systems characteristics 
(model 6) on reading scores of immigrant and native students with the measured and country-
centered track-level 
 Immigrant students Native students 
 Measured track-
level 
Centered track-
level 
Measured track-
level 
Centered track-
level 
Constant 457.7 (44.2) 457.2 (45.6) 483.4 (59.8) 463.6 (61.7) 
Individual characteristics     
Parental ESCS 25.0** (2.1) 24.9** (2.1) 27.4** (0.6) 27.4** (0.6) 
Eastern Europe origin (ref= Western OECD 
countries) 
-8.2 (6.8) -6.9 (7.0) - - 
Non-Islamic Asia origin (ref= Western OECD 
countries) 
18.6* (10.2) 19.6* (10.5) - - 
Islamic countries origin (ref= Western OECD 
countries) 
-35.3** (8.4) -35.2** (8.6) - - 
Sub-Saharan Africa origin (ref= Western 
OECD countries) 
-15.0 (14.2) -14.6 (14.7) - - 
Female 28.6** (1.6) 28.6** (1.6)  30.6** (0.5) 30.6** (0.6) 
Home language same as in destination country 24.2** (2.2) 24.2** (2.2) - - 
One parent migrant, other parent native 5.8 (3.8) 5.7 (3.8) - - 
Second generation migrant 9.3** (1.8) 9.4** (1.8) - - 
Grade (destination country centered) 31.8** (1.8) 33.0** (1.8) 41.1** (0.7) 40.9** (0.7) 
School-composition characteristics at track-
within-school 
    
Average ESCS 46.9** (5.1) 46.9** (5.1) 46.1** (3.1) 46.3** (3.0) 
% students from Eastern Europe (ref=% native 
students) 
0.4** (0.2) 0.4** (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) -0.1 (0.2) 
% students from non-Islamic Asia (ref=% 
native students) 
1.2** (0.2) 1.2** (0.2) 0.5** (0.2) 0.6** (0.2) 
% students from Islamic countries (ref=% 
native students) 
0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 0.1 (0.2) 0.1 (0.2) 
% students from western OECD countries 
(ref=% native students) 
0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) -0.3 (0.2) -0.3 (0.2) 
% students from Sub-Saharan Africa (ref=% 
native students) 
-0.2 (0.4) -0.2 (0.4) -0.5 (0.4) -0.5 (0.4) 
ESCS diversity  20.0 (14.0) 18.8 (14.0) -5.9 (7.3) -6.2 (7.2) 
Ethnic diversity  -40.3** (11.2) -40.9** (11.2) -16.2 (10.9) -16.6 (10.8) 
Curriculum at track-within-school     
Vocational (ref=general) -54.1** (4.6) -48.7** (4.5) -52.4** (2.4) -51.0** (2.3) 
Higher secondary (ref=lower) -0.8 (4.9) -1.0 (2.6) -4.2 (2.9) -2.6 (1.5) 
Selective admittance (ref= Some selective 
admittance) 
18.0** (2.8) 18.5** (2.8) 16.4** (2.3) 16.3** (2.3) 
Non selective admittance (ref= Some selective 
admittance) 
1.0 (2.4) 1.0 (2.4) -2.3 (1.6) -2.2 (1.6) 
School characteristics     
Teacher shortage -1.6 (1.1) -1.6 (1.1) -4.8** (0.8) -4.8** (0.8) 
Student/staff ratio 0.8** (0.3) 0.7** (0.3) 0.5** (0.2) 0.6** (0.2) 
School in city (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 2.6 (2.7) -1.8 (1.9) -1.9 (1.9) 
School in rural (ref=towns) 2.7 (2.7) 2.6 (2.7) 5.6** (1.7) 5.6** (1.7) 
School-size*100 0.7** (0.2) 0.7** (0.2) 1.4** (0.2) 1.3** (0.2) 
Private dependent (ref=Public school) -4.9 (3.7) -5.3 (3.7) -7.4** (2.5) -7.3** (2.5) 
Private independent (ref=Public school) -6.4 (5.4) -6.9 (5.4) -9.1** (4.0) -8.5** (3.9) 
Educational system characteristics     
Strongly stratified (ref= Comprehensive) -16.7 (14.5) -10.9 (15.0) -1.9 (18.9) 8.7 (19.4) 
Moderately stratified (ref= Comprehensive) -16.7 (13.1) -1.1 (12.7) -16.8 (14.1) -3.3 (13.9) 
Age of selection -2.3 (2.6) -2.3 (2.7) -0.7 (3.7) 0.4 (3.8) 
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Interactions with educational systems     
Parental ESCS* strongly stratified -16.5** (2.5) -16.4 **(2.5) -16.4** (0.8) -16.4** (0.8) 
Parental ESCS* moderately stratified -16.5** (3.3) -16.4** (3.3) -15.9** (0.9) -15.9** (0.9) 
Average ESCS* strongly stratified 19.5** (6.2) 21.3** (6.2) -2.6 (3.7) -4.56 (4.2) 
Average ESCS* moderately stratified -11.0 (8.3) -8.8 (8.6) 6.4 (4.3) 4.2 (4.4) 
Higher secondary* strongly stratified 16.3** (6.5) 4.3 (3.3) 11.9** (3.9) 8.1** (2.0) 
Higher secondary* moderately stratified 32.7** (9.8) 16.7* (5.1) 25.1** (8.1) 18.7** (3.9) 
Reproduction      
Parental ESCS* average ESCS -0.5 (1.8) -0.4 (1.8) -1.1* (0.6) -1.2* (0.6) 
Variation     
Individual-level 4516.2 (89.0) 4511.0 (88.9) 4447.3 (23.9) 4447.4 (23.9) 
Track-within-school-level 917.1 (82.8) 926.0 (83.1) 307.7 (41.9) 309.0 (41.9) 
School-level  - - 759.0 (50.4) 746.2 (50.1) 
Origin-country-level 000.0 (00.0) 000.0 (00.0) - - 
Destination-country-level 444.6 (91.7) 484.6 (98.8) 279.6 (107.1) 299.3 (114.2) 
Log likelihood 97314 97321 818466 818444 
Source: PISA 2006; own computation 
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Appendix G: estimation of educational performance of first generation immigrant students from Western OECD countries with different parental 
ESCS, in schools with different ESCS composition and track-level and in different educational systems (model 6 of table 2). The scores of the 
immigrant students from Eastern Europe, non-Islamic Asia, Islamic countries and Sub-Saharan African countries can be obtained by changing 
the scores with -8.2, +18.6, -35.3 and -15.0 respectively. The scores of second-generation immigrant students should be changed with +9.3, of 
those who use the same language as the destination country with +24.2 and those with mixed parents with +5.8. 
 
comprehensive & lowest school ECSC (-2.07) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0.8 -0.8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
moderately stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 -4.6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 
  198,5 384,6 246 438,7 254 446,7 
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comprehensive & highest school ECSC (1.64) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,8 -0,8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
moderately stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 
  374,1 553 428,2 607,1 427,4 606,3 
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Moderately stratified & lowest school ECSC (-2.07) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,2 6,2 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
moderately stratified -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 32,7 32,7 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 -4.6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 
  259,4 323,4 306,9 377,5 345,8 416,4 
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Moderately stratified & highest school ECSC (1.64) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,8 -0,8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
moderately stratified -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 32,7 32,7 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 -18,0 -18,0 -18,0 -18,0 -18,0 -18,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 
  412 468,8 466,1 522,9 498 554,8 
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strongly stratified & lowest school ECSC (-2.07) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 -97,1 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,8 -0,8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 
moderately stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 16,3 16,3 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 -40,4 -40,4 -40,4 -40,4 -40,4 -40,4 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 -4.6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 -4,6 3,1 
  214 278 261,5 332,1 277 347,6 
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strongly & highest school ECSC (1.64) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.0) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 457,7 
School ESCS 46,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 76,9 
Vocational -54,1 -54,1 -54,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -0.8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,8 -0,8 
Parent ESCS 25,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 -110,0 75,0 
strongly stratified -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 -16,7 
moderately stratified -16,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher*strongly 16,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 16,3 16,3 
higher*moderately 32,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
School ESCS*strongly 19,5 32,0 32,0 32,0 32,0 32,0 32,0 
School ESCS*moderately -11,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 72,6 -49,5 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -16,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -0,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 3,6 -2,5 
  462 518,8 516,1 572,9 531,6 588,4 
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Appendix H: estimation of educational performance of comparable native students with different parental ESCS, in schools with different ESCS 
composition and track-level and in different educational systems (model 6 of table 1). 
 
comprehensive & lowest school ECSC (-2.19) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
Constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 -4,2 -4,2 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
moderately stratified -16.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*strongly 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*moderately 25.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 
  218,4 428,3 270,8 480,7 266,6 476,5 
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comprehensive & highest school ECSC (1.69) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0 0 0 0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 -4,2 -4,2 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
moderately stratified -16.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*strongly 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*moderately 25.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 
  416,1 593,2 468,5 645,6 464,3 641,4 
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Moderately stratified & lowest school ECSC (-2.19) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 -4,2 -4,2 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
moderately stratified -16.8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 
higher*strongly 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*moderately 25.1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 -14,0 -14,0 -14,0 -14,0 -14,0 -14,0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 70,0 -52,5 70,0 -52,5 70,0 -52,5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 
  282,7 370,1 335,1 422,5 330,9 418,3 
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Moderately stratified & highest school ECSC (1.69) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0 0 0 0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 -4,2 -4,2 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
moderately stratified -16.8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 -16,8 
higher*strongly 11.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*moderately 25.1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 25,1 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 10,8 10,8 10,8 10,8 10,8 10,8 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 70,0 -52,5 70,0 -52,5 70,0 -52,5 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 
  505,2 559,8 557,6 612,2 553,4 608 
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Strongly stratified & lowest school ECSC (-2.19) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 -101,0 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 
moderately stratified -16.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*strongly 11.9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 
higher*moderately 25.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 72,2 -54,1 72,2 -54,1 72,2 -54,1 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 -10,6 7,9 
  306,3 389,9 358,7 442,3 358,8 442,4 
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Strongly stratified & highest school ECSC (1.69) 
 parameter 
lowest parent ECSC (-4.4) 
& vocational 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& vocational 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& lower 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& lower 
lowest 
parent 
ECSC (-4.4) 
& general 
& higher 
highest 
parent 
ECSC (3.3) 
& general 
& higher 
constant 483.4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 483,4 
School ESCS 46.1 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 77,9 
vocational -52.4 -52,4 -52,4 0 0 0 0 
higher secondary -4.2 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 
Parent ESCS 27.4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 -101,0 90,4 
strongly stratified -1.9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 -1,9 
moderately stratified -16.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
higher*strongly 11.9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 11,9 
higher*moderately 25.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
School ESCS*strongly -2,6 -4,4 -4,4 -4,4 -4,4 -4,4 -4,4 
School ESCS*moderately 6,4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*strongly  -16.4 72,2 -54,1 72,2 -54,1 72,2 -54,1 
Parent ESCS*moderately  -15.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Parent ESCS*school ESCS -1,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 8,2 -6,1 
  493,9 544,7 546,3 597,1 546,4 597,2 
 
 
